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THE IMPACT OF TITLES
I & IV OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT
ROBERT

I.

L.

BERCHEMt

INTRODUCTION

Q INCE

ITS ENACTMENT in 1959, the widely known LandrumGriffin Act (the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959) has been the subject of constant discussion, both academic
and pragmatic. Such attention is most certainly justified, and in fact
obligatory, for as will be amplified subsequently, this Act is the product
of a radical change in congressional attitude toward the problems of
internal union government. However, due to the fact that the Act is
not definitive in language or scope, it has been the subject of constant
judicial interpretation, with the result that it has far outstripped its
original statutory framework. It is precisely because of this judicial
reconstruction during the past eight years that I have undertaken to
reanalyze and recast the Act as it actually stands today. In so doing,
I have adhered to its statutory framework for reasons of topical
and logical continuity, and have, within such a guideline, sought to
analyze its development from a case law perspective.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959'
represents a unique departure from the long established principle of
American legislative and judicial experience that the internal mechanics
of voluntary associations are beyond the reach of governmental regulation.2 Founded upon the firm conviction that "racketeering, corrupt Member of the Connecticut Bar. A.B., Fairfield University, 1962; J.D.,
Villanova University, 1965; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1967. The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and advice of Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine
of the University of Michigan Law School.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
2. The rationale behind this principle is that:
Intervention in internal affairs reduces . . . autonomy and creates a spectre
of close legal control which would make private groups adjuncts of the allpowerful state. Fearful of this end, the courts intuitively resist involvement.
Combined with this is the courts' uncertainty as to their competence to regulate
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
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tion, abuse of power, and other improper practices on the part of some
labor organizations [could not] be prevented until and unless the
Congress of the United States [had] the wisdom and the courage to
enact laws prescribing minimum standards of democratic process and
conduct for the administration of internal union affairs, '8 the statute
itself is far less noble in character. It is, in fact, a prime example of
the fine art of political compromise.4
Conceived as early as 1943,' the idea of external enforcement of
democracy within the structure of organized labor drew growing support both from the liberal left and, for pragmatic purposes, from
management. Resting upon the often articulated assumption, apparently
accepted de fide by Congress, that labor organizations should function
democratically,' the LMRDA, consistent with these ideological origins,
envisions a two-fold union governmental structure wherein decisions are
subject to the influence of the rank and file, and majorities tolerate the
existence and views of minorities. 7 Titles I and IV' of the Act, in
the complex relationships within the union or their ability to supervise the union's
internal operation.
Summers, The Impact of Landrum-Griffin in State Courts, 13 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE
ON LABOR 333, 338 (1960).
Professor Summers, however, has been its leading
iconoclast. See, e.g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1951) ; Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. REL.
REv. 15 (1950); Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
483 (1950).
3. Remarks of Senator McClellan, in 105 CONe.. Rec. 6471 (1959).
4. See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act
of 1959, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 819, 833 (1960) ; Rothman, Legislative History of the
"Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REv. 199 (1960). Congressman
Griffin himself termed it as a "scissors and paste" affair. Address by Congressman
Robert P. Griffin, Labor Law Section of the Michigan State Bar, Annual Meeting,
Sept. 25, 1959, quoted in, Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195, 197 (1960).
5. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS
(1943). The first formal implementation of the ACLU's program came in 1947, when
it submitted a proposed union democracy statute to Congress. See Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Education and Labor on Bills to Amend or Repeal the National
Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3633-43 (1947). For a discussion of this
and other similar legislation see Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal
Union Affairs - II, 44 ILL. L. REV. 631 (1949).
6. The practicality of this thesis has received academic challenge. See Magrath,
Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy, 12 IND. & LAB. REL.
REV. 503 (1959). However, it does undeniably stand - as it must - as the utopian
goal of the American labor movement. "An individual worker gains no human rights
by substituting an autocratic union officialdom for the tyranny of the boss. Only a
democratic union, sensitive to the rights of the minorities, can help men achieve the
ideals of individual responsibility, equality of opportunity, and self-determination."
Cox, The Role of Laz in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 609-10
(1959). But see W. WIRTZ, LABOR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 85 (1964).
7. The term "democracy" as used in labor relations law has been defined quite
differently by several commentators who view the relationship between labor and
management as a constant series of confrontations between incompatible interests.
Under this definition, a union's "democracy" is measured insofar as it represents the
interests of its members - regardless of the nature of its internal government or its
responsiveness to its membership. It is doubtful whether such an approach - prescinding from its validity - could ever find general acceptance either in Congress or in
the American labor movement. See note 6 supra. See also S. LIPSET, UNION DEMoCRACY 457-63 (1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15, 481-83 (1964).
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particular, are directed toward this end. Title I provides for a privately
enforceable "Bill of Rights" for union members; more specifically, it
provides for equal rights with reference to nominating, voting, meeting
participation, freedom of speech and assembly, protection from arbitrary
dues collection, and the right to sue, as well as safeguards against improper disciplinary action. Title IV, on the other hand, regulates the
mode in which rights are exercised by establishing detailed procedures
for nominating, campaigning, and voting in union elections. 9
III.

TITLE

I:

SCOPE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

A. The Membership Limitation
Title I, as might be expected in view of its spotty legislative
history, 10 is severely limited in the scope of its application and applies
only to "members" of labor organizations." A member, as defined,
"includes any person 2 who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in such organization" and who has neither withdrawn, been
expelled, or suspended.'" This legislative definition is certainly not a
broad one,' 4 and despite the hopes expressed by several early commentators,' 5 particularly with reference to racial problems, it has been
narrowly construed by the courts.' 6
9. Title II requires the preparation and distribution of certain reports by labor
organizations, their officers, employees and employers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (1964).
Title III specifies both the circumstances under which a union trusteeship may be

established as well as the details of its administration. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (1964).
Title V prescribes safeguards for the preservation of union funds. 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-04
(1964). Title VI is miscellaneous and includes, inter alia, provisions dealing with the
Secretary of Labor's right to investigate as well as the criminal enforcement of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 521-31 (1964).
10. See note 4 supra.

11. While the ensuing discussion will demonstrate the extent of controversy over
the question of who is a "member," it has never been seriously disputed that an
acknowledged "non-member" was without rights under the Act. Johnson v. Local 58,
Elec. Workers, 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1960) ; see Stone v. Local 29, Boilermakers, 55 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,736 (D. Mass. 1967) (validly expelled member not
entitled to bring Title I action). But cf. Axelrod v. Stoltz, 264 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.
Pa. 1967) (suspended member entitled to sue for reinstatement upon expiration of
his suspension). A non-member employee does, however, have a right to obtain a
copy of the collective bargaining contract under which he is working from the union
which negotiated it. 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1964).
12. The Act is applicable only to individuals. Therefore, for example, it provides
no relief in an action in which a local union alleges a Title I violation on the part of
a district council. Cox v. Hutcheson, 204 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (1964).
14. The original bill passed by the Senate included within its definition anyone
who "tendered" the lawful requirements for union membership. S. 1555, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 601(n) (1959). It was deleted however in the final draft. This had the
effect of rendering Title I consistent with section 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor
Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA], insofar as the latter provided that nothing within it should be considered as "impair[ing] the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A).
15. See, e.g., Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 860-61, 863 (1960) ; Summers, American Legislation

Published
Villanova
University Charles
WidgerL.School
Law286
Digital
Repository, 1967
forby Union
Democracy,
25 MODERN
REv. of
273,
(1962).
16. See pp. 4-5 infra.
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In Hughes v. Local 11, Iron Workers," plaintiff, a member of
the International Union, requested a transfer from his home local to the
defendant local. The defendant, while allowing the plaintiff to work in
its area, refused to grant him a formal transfer permit; likewise, while
allowing him to attend its meetings, it refused to let him participate
or vote. Claiming that he was being denied equal rights and privileges
as guaranteed by section 101 (a) (1) of Title I, the plaintiff brought a
private civil suit to enforce them." The district court, reading the definitional section of a "member" narrowly, dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that Title I "has no relation to extrinsic matters
such as the right to transfer to or from an organization."' 9 The court of
appeals reversed.2" Noting that plaintiff was already a member of the
International Union, and entitled by the International's constitution to a
transfer as a matter of right, it distinguished the case from the standard
situation where a voluntary association has a "reservation of power"
upon which to base a discretionary denial of admission. The court
left little doubt that it in no way intended to limit the rights of labor
organizations to establish restrictive requirements for membership and
essentially limited the case to its facts, 2' some broad phraseology notwithstanding. 2
17. 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1961).
18. See note 39 infra. As a means of enforcement, the private suit was an afterthought on the part of most of the LMRDA's proponents. See Cox, supra note 4,
at 832-33. It was, however, considered to be of some significance. As Senator Kuchel
stated when he introduced the provision:
[H]ere . .

.

is one of the major changes in the proposal.

The Amendment of

the Senator from Arkansas provided that the Secretary of Labor might, on behalf
of the injured or aggrieved member, have the right to litigate the alleged grievance
and to seek an injunction or other relief. We believe that giving this type of
right to the aggrieved employee member himself is in the interest of justice....
105 CONG. Rec. 6720 (1959).
The validity of this thesis is, however, subject to some question. For although
private suits are speedy, they are also costly. Conversely, public suits, although
slower, benefit from the expertise of the administrative prosecutor and cost the individual litigant nothing.
19. Hughes v. Local 11, Iron Workers, 183 F. Supp. 552, 553 (D.N.J. 1960).
20. Prefatorily the court noted that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was improper under any circumstances. Under such an analysis a district court would be
required to first determine the substantive validity of an asserted claim, i.e., whether
a plaintiff was a "member," before being able to assume jurisdiction. "The well
established practice, on the other hand, has been that the assertion of a substantial
claim under a federal statute gives a United States court jurisdiction of that claim even
though that court may determine ultimately that no cause of action on which relief
could be granted was alleged." 287 F.2d at 814. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
21. For reasons known best only to themselves, locals within the International
Association of Iron Workers have been consistently reluctant to allow free transfers
between one another. See, e.g., Ferger v. Local 483, Iron Workers, 356 F.2d 854
(3d Cir. 1966). While the "transfer" cases have not provided any significant law of
general application, they have posed an interesting problem as to the extent to which
relief is available under Title I. Thus far, where a cause of action has been found, relief
has been limited to a granting of "rights to membership," rather than "membership"
itself. Ferger v. Local 483, Iron Workers, 238 F. Supp. 1016 (D.N.J. 1964). The Third
Circuit, however, in Ferger,indicated a willingness to clarify the issue. 356 F.2d at 855.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
22. "[Tlhe Act's protection is extended to those who are everything that members are, to those who are in substance members, despite the fact that the officials of
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Any possible doubts to the contrary were put to rest by the Ninth
Circuit in Moynahan v. Pari-MutuelEmployee Guild, Local 280.23 In
Moynahan, the plaintiff had fulfilled all requirements for union membership except for receiving a two-thirds vote of approval from the
defendant's membership. In his complaint he alleged that defendant,
by arbitrarily refusing him admission, prevented him from obtaining
work as a pari-mutuel clerk since all such jobs were subject to a closed
shop agreement. Despite the obvious attraction of such facts as an
interpretative vehicle, the court held that the requirement of a twothirds vote could "hardly be characterized as a mere formality or
ministerial act," 4 and that, therefore, the membership requirements
were not met. It distinguished Hughes on the grounds that there
the local union had no valid right to refuse plaintiff's transfer application.
Regardless of whatever policy criticisms the composite HughesMoynahan result provokes, in view of the legislative background upon
which it rests,25 no other result would have been justified. Furthermore, it is not surprising. The concept of unions as voluntary associations, with all its resultant ramifications, is deeply rooted. While it
has certainly been shaken by the passage of the LMRDA,26 it was far
from toppled, especially in the courts where the passage of time has
rendered it near sacred. Even without the legislative background of
the Act, it is doubtful that the courts would have given Title I a wide
range of application; the presence of a limited legislative intent merely
28
insured that they would not.

the particular labor organization have not performed the ministerial acts precedent to
formal admission and recognition." 287 F.2d at 815. The phrases "in substance" and
"ministerial acts" are obviously amenable to varied "interpretation."

23. 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963).
24. Id. at 210.
25. See note 14 supra; cf. H.R. 4473, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c) (1959)
S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(9) (1959); S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601(n)
(1959) ; H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(o) (1959) ; H.R. 8342, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(o) (1959).
This legislative development can undoubtedly be traced
both to the well-founded fears of certain sectional legislators who envisaged the rise
of federal process to enforce union integration - even prescinding from the analogous
civil rights precedents thereby created - coupled with the equally valid conviction
of others that half a loaf was better than none. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 15721-23
(1959).
26. "Most noteworthy in this Act is the emphasis, not upon contract or property
rights, but upon the analogy between the rights of union members and the rights of
citizens in a political democracy . . . a far cry indeed from the concept of a labor
union as a private voluntary association." R. SMITH & L. MERRIFIELD, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 998 (1960).
27. This, of course, is not universally true. See Mitchell v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961) ; cf. Gurton v. Arons,
339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964).
28. The current status of the non-union member of a collective bargaining unit
typifies the harsher results of the maintenance of the "voluntary" principle. Stripped
of his individual right to bargain by section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1964), such an employee's sole protection, insofar as his job rights are concerned,
Published
by Villanova
Charlesduty
Widgerof School
Law Digital Repository,
comes
from aUniversity
rather vague
"fair ofrepresentation"
which 1967
the courts have
imposed on unions in such representative capacities. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
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A further corollary to the restriction of the benefits of Title I to
union "members" is that, even as to members, these benefits accrue
only insofar as explicitly secured membership rights of Title I are involved.29 Neither union employees"0 nor union officials"' have standing
to sue to protect their jobs or positions even if they are coincidentally
members. Likewise, because of the lack of union involvement, members
may not sue fellow members,8" although in certain cases criminal sanc345 U.S. 330 (1953) ; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
see Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Jndicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 1435, 1464-1523
(1963) ; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. Rgv. 151 (1957). For
such an individual, a union is hardly a "voluntary" association; for such an association, legitimatized and certified by the government, voluntariness is hardly necessary.
See S. SLIcHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 118-20, 123 (1947).
Much of this harshness has, however, been alleviated by the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 which severely limits unions' powers of exclusion. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2 to 3 (1964).
29. Even where this condition is met, jurisdiction under Title I may be preempted
by the National Labor Relations Act. For example, in Barunica v. Hatters Workers
Local 55, 321 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1963), where plaintiff essentially alleged that the
union had maliciously discriminated against her by refusing to refer her out for
employment, the court held that this stated, at best, a section 8(b) (2) unfair labor
practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Accord, Knox v. UAW
Local 900, 223 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1963), aff'd, 351 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1965)
(allegation of unfair representation) ; Green v. Local 705, Hotel Employees, 220 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (allegation of discrimination in job referral) ; cf. Local
100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963) ; San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). However, both the Third and Fourth
Circuits have assumed jurisdiction of section 101 (a) (5) cases even though the "discipline" imposed by the union might have constituted unfair labor practices. See
Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Local 446, Meatcutters, 320 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1963);
Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 976 (1963).
30. In Strauss v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa.
1959), where a union business agent was removed without a hearing because of a
past criminal record, his suit was dismissed since it did not deal with a union-member
relationship but rather an employer (union) -employee (business agent) relationship.
The common law of employment contracts, rather than Title I, was held to provide
whatever remedies he was entitled to. Accord, Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626,
306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962) (union business agent); Bennet v. Hoisting Eng'rs
Local 701, 207 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1960) (field representative) ; Jackson v.
Martin Co., 180 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1960) (union committeeman) ; cf. Fanning v.
United Scenic Artists Local 829, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 11,678 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
31. See Mamula v. Local 1211, United Steelworkers, 202 F. Supp. 348 (W.D.
Pa. 1962) (local president removed) ; Hamilton v. Guinan, 199 F. Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (vice president dismissed) ; Burton v. Packinghouse Workers Local 12, 199
F. Supp. 138 (D. Kan. 1961) (division representative removed for malfeasance in
office). This, of course, does not prevent an officer from asserting the rights which
he has as a member. Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 204 F. Supp. 241
(D. Conn. 1962) (president removed from office and expelled from union) ; cf. Grand
Lodge, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 920 (1964) ; George v. Bricklayers Int'l Union, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,376
(E.D. Wisc. 1966).
32. In Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961), where plaintiff alleged
that defendants, who were union officials, had libeled and assaulted him, his complaint
was dismissed since it named defendants only as individuals, not union officials. Title I
was held not to "provide a civil remedy for the vindication of rights contained in the
bill of rights against one who in violating such rights is not acting in the capacity of
an official or agent of a labor union." Id. at 625-26. While the case initially prompted
fears of potential abuse, see Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members under
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
Title I and Section 610 of the Landrum-Grilln Act, 52 Ggo. L.J. 339, 341 (1964),
they have proven to be unjustified.
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tions are available.88 These limitations are both justified and necessary
to prevent Title I from assuming omnibus stature; furthermore, in each
instance, adequate alternative remedies are available.
B.

Equal Rights and Privileges

Section 101(a) (1) of the "Bill of Rights" provision of Title I
specifically guarantees to union members, subject to reasonable regulation, 4 equal rights and privileges in nominating and voting in elections and in attending and participating at meetings.8 5 Its obvious
purpose is to promote the interests of union democracy 6 by protecting
the rights of individual union members vis-A-vis their unions.8" Unfortunately, in addition to its basic conceptual limitations, its ability to
achieve that goal has been further circumscribed by recent judicial
interpretation.
1.

Right to Nominate and Vote

The right to nominate and vote, as provided by Title I, is paralleled
in Title IV by section 401 (e) which requires that in any union election
it.*. a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of
candidates and every member in good standing ... shall have the right
to vote. .

. .""

The interrelationship of these guarantees, aside from

academic curiosity, assumes significant stature in the administration
of the LMRDA because of the diversity of relief available under each.
Under Title I, the appropriate means of relief is the immediate filing
of a private civil suit in the federal district court by the aggrieved
member.8" A Title IV case, on the other hand, in addition to being
33. In United States v. Roganovich, 318 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1963), where plaintiff
was attacked at a union meeting by two fellow members, a criminal action could be
brought against the assailants under section 610, 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1964), even though
they were not acting for or on behalf of the union. Section 610 by its language,
applies to the activities of "any person" whereas section 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964),
applies only to labor organizations or their representatives.
34. For case law analysis of the "reasonable rules and regulations" provisions of
section 101(a) (1) (2), see pp. 38-40 infra.
35. The statute reads:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate
in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to
reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitutions and bylaws.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1964).
36. Stout v. Construction Laborers Dist. Council, 226 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill.
1963) ; Wittstein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 223 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
aff'd, 326 F.2d 26, rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 171 (1964) ; Green v. Local 705,
Hotel Employees, 220 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
37. Bradley v. Local 119, Elec. Workers, 236 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964).
39.Villanova
29 U.S.C.
§ 412 Charles
(1964) Widger
Published by
University
School
of Law
Digitalwhose
Repository,
provides:
"Any
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rights1967
secured by the
provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter
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limited to post-election remedies,4" requires that the complaining parties
press their action indirectly. No private civil suit is authorized;
rather, a complaint must first be filed with the Secretary of Labor who,
if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation has taken place,
may file suit in an appropriate federal district court. 1 Apart from considerations of individual expense, the tactical disadvantages of this
procedure are obvious. Faced with oftentimes flagrant abuses of their
rights during the course of union elections, union members began, predictably, to file Title I suits; incumbent union officials, with equal
predictability, moved to dismiss these suits on jurisdictional grounds,
arguing that Title IV provided the exclusive remedy for election abuses.
In Beckman v. Local 46, Ironworkers,42 plaintiff alleged in substance that defendants had "stuffed" the ballot box in their local union's
election. In affirming the district court's injunction which restrained
the removal or counting of the contested votes, the court of appeals
found that the complaint did state a claim for violation of Title I's
"right to vote" clause in that although each member voted, his vote
was not effective. In Robins v. Rarback,4" however, the Second Circuit
took a narrower view. Plaintiff there alleged that defendants had
allowed non-registered voters to participate in their local election and
had not protected the secrecy of the ballot. The court, in affirming the
dismissal of the complaint, noted that it was most unlikely that Congress
"would have provided these elaborate protections against unjustifiable
interference with internal union processes [Title IV] if it had intended
at the same time that the courts should be free under Title I of the
may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief
(including injunctions) as may be appropriate ..
"
Although injunctive relief is probably the most frequent form of relief, damage
awards are not uncommon. While there is a split of authority on whether punitive
damages may be obtained, compare Burris v. International Bhd. of Carpenters, 52
CCH Lab. Cas. J 16,571 (E.D. Pa. 1965) with Farowitz v. Associated Musicians
Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), there is no question but that compensatory awards are available, subject, of course, to common law rules of causation.
McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing, 216 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Tenn.
1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965). Thus, for example, emotional distress,
standing alone, is not a proper element of damage. International Bhd. of Boilermakers
v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965). But it is when coupled with injury to
reputation. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th
Cir. 1965).
There is also a split of authority on the availability of a jury trial. Compare
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, supra, with McCraw v. United
Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing, supra; see Note, 35 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 459 (1966).
However, there is no question but that attorney's fees are not recoverable. Vars v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 204 F. Supp. 241 (D. Conn. 1962).
40. There are two exceptions to this restriction. Section 401(c) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 481(c) (1964), authorizes pre-election suits by any bona fide candidate for
union office to enforce his guaranteed right to inspect membership lists. Additionally,
section 403 allows pre-election state court suits to enforce union constitutions.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964). See p. 45 infra.
42. 314 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
43. 325 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1963).
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Act to reach the same result at the instance of the complaining member
alone . . .'"" without requiring either an exhaustion of remedies or

investigation by the Secretary of Labor. It should be noted that here
the "right to vote" per se was not violated, but rather the effectiveness
of the vote was interfered with. Faced with such diversity of interpretation,4 5 the Supreme Court granted review of Calhoon v. Harvey. 6
In Calhoon three members of a local union filed a Title I suit

alleging that their rights to nominate candidates, as guaranteed by section 101 (a) (1), were violated by the union's bylaws which provided
for self-nomination only and by the national constitution which restricted candidacy eligibility to five year members who had been active
in the trade4 7 Noting that Title I had been added to the LMRDA
because Title IV did not go "far enough in protecting basic rights of
union members, ' 48 and that even at common law plaintiffs would have
been able to have had defendant's classification scheme declared invalid,
the court of appeals concluded that it would be singularly anomalous
to read Title IV as foreclosing all Title I relief for overlapping claims
of unreasonable union classification. Without considering either regulation separately, it therefore held that the "combined effect of the
[candidacy] eligibility requirements and the restriction to self-nomina-

tion"49 was sufficient to state a Title I nomination case. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed5" and held that section 101 (a) (1) was "no
more than a command that members and classes of members shall not
be discriminated against in their right to nominate and vote,"'" and
that furthermore, in determining whether or not discrimination exists,
"possible violations of Title IV . . . regarding [candidacy] eligibility
are not relevant ..
"52 Put another way, it determined that so long
as a union's regulations are applied "equally," they are safe from Title
I sanction regardless of their unreasonableness.
44. Id. at 931. The same court, albeit a different panel, did not feel so restricted
in interpreting the "right to nominate" clause of section 101 (a) (1). See Harvey v.
Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963).
45. See also, e.g., Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962)
Jackson v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962);
Johnson v. Waiters Local 500, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961) ; Colpo v. Local 107,
Teamsters, 201 F. Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1961), vacated as moot, 305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
46. 221 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
granted, 375 U.S. 991 (1964).
47. As members of the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, candidates were required to have served 180 days or more of sea-time in each of two of
the preceding three years on vessels subject to union negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
48. Harvey v. Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1963).
49. Id. at 489.
50. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
Id. at 139.
Published51.
by Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
52. Id.
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There is no question but that section 101 (a) (1) grants no substantive right to vote as such, 53 for by its own terms, it merely seeks
to impose an equality of rights rather than rights themselves. However,
to adopt an interpretation of this section which does not provide for
effective equality in voting, similar to that granted in the reapportionment cases,54 and which authorizes pro forma observation of those
rights which are granted, is singularly objectionable. Prior to LandrumGriffin, even though rights were often granted in a discriminatory
fashion, when granted, they were at least considered meaningful. As a
result of the Calhoon Court's interpretation of section 101(a) (1),
however, there is provided to unions a decidedly convenient means of
subtle rather than blatant disenfranchisement.
The Calhoon decision is based upon an interpretation of congressional intent - an extremely difficult item to discern in the historical
context of the LMRDA."5 The disparity between courts of appeals resulting in even internal inconsistency" - provides convincing evidence of its elusiveness in this specific area. Against such a background,
Calhoon is open to particularly severe criticism for, although essentially
free to adopt a reasonable construction of the statute upon policy
grounds, the Court nevertheless saw fit to emasculate it. Certainly congressional policy would not be furthered by authorizing full scale preelection intervention by private suit; but neither is it aided by the
imposition of a de facto blanket prohibition. 57 The approach used by
the Second Circuit - allowing more egregious violations which overlap
both titles to be speedily remedied under Title I - would appear to have
been far more consistent with the basic congressional intent of flexibly
protecting the rights of individual union members.
Although Calhoon has been read as merely stating that Title I
was inapplicable because plaintiffs were in fact alleging a Title IV
candidacy infringement rather than a nomination deprivation, such an
approach, while desirable to the extent that it mitigates much of the
formal emasculative effect of the decision, flies in the face of the
Court's plain wording."' In any event, whether the Court's interpre53. The same holds true, of course, with reference to the rights of nomination
and/or meeting participation. See p. 13 infra.
54. The essence of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny was a
guarantee of the effective exercise of the franchise by means of the one man-one
vote principle.
55. See Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 78 HARV. L. Rlv. 1617, 1623-26 (1965). See generally Smith, supra
note 4, at 197-98.
56. Compare Robins v. Rarback, 325 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1963) with Harvey v.
Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963).

57. See note 59 infra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
58. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion stated his view on Calhoon's effect:
After today, simply by framing its discriminatory rules in terms of eligibility, a
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tation of section 101 (a) (1) be considered as a holding or dictum, its
practical effect upon the lower courts, and hence upon the administration of the Act itself, has been the same."
In the wake of Calhoon, it is difficult to postulate what influence
section 101 (a) (1) will exert in the administration of union democracy.
While recent case law amply demonstrates the continued vitality of
section 101 (a) (1), there is no escaping the fact that it is far from the
fundamental guarantee envisioned by its authors. 0 Even to the extent
that it is applicable, it is not absolute." If a union member is fairly
convicted of violating his union's constitution or bylaws, his right
to nominate and vote may be suspended as a disciplinary measure.6 2
And while several pre-Calhoon cases interpreted section 101 (a) (1)
as prohibiting pro forma voting,6" in view of the doubts which Calhoon
necessarily has placed on their validity, 4 perhaps the most important
union can immunize itself from pre-election attack in a federal court even though
it makes deep incursions on the equal rights of its members to nominate, to vote,
and to participate in the union's internal affairs.

379 U.S. at 140.

59. Post-Calhoon case law has evidenced an extremely narrow reading of section 101 (a) (1). For example, in Avery v. International Alliance of Stage Employees,
54 CCH Lab. Cas.
11,453 (N.D. Cal. 1965), where plaintiffs filed a Title I suit
challenging the validity of a local union's procedure for nominating delegates to the
international's convention, the court, without commenting on the reasonableness of
the procedure, held that no Title I case had been alleged since the claimed discrimination arose from requirements equally applicable to all. Likewise in Paravate v. Local
13, Ins. Workers, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. J 19,695 (W.D. Pa. 1965), where plaintiffs
filed a Title I suit challenging the validity of defendants' officers conduct in voiding a
nomination procedure under which they had been nominated as representatives to their
International's convention, the court held that since the complaint merely went to
"the propriety of a certain method of nomination" and not to any questions of unequal
application, it was an exclusively Title IV issue. The same conclusion dealing with
the right to vote was reached in Jennings v. Carey, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 19,423
(D.D.C. 1964). On the other hand, in O'Brien v. Paddock, 246 F. Supp. 809
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), where plaintiffs, associate members of the defendant union, alleged
that they were being denied their equal right to vote, the court denied a motion to
dismiss based upon Calhoon. See Vestal v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 245 F.
Supp. 623 (M.D. Tenn. 1965); cf. Local 115, Carpenters v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 247 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1965). The short of it is that in the post-Calhoon
LMRDA no Title I actions will be allowed unless they are specifically phrased in
terms of inequality of application, that is, discrimination. It seems certain that "discrimination," despite its amenability to elastic construction, will be narrowly confined
to its literal boundaries.
60. See, e.g., remarks of Senator McClellan, in 105 CONG. R;c. 6469-74 (1959).
61. Even if a member is deprived of his right to vote, no relief is available if his
vote would have been ineffectual anyway. Wingate v. Local 107, Teamsters, 51 CCH
Lab. Cas. 1 19,643 (D. Del. 1964). The jurisdictional basis of the court's decision is
open to question. See note 73 infra.
62. Robinson v. Boilermakers Local 104, 47 CCH Lab. Cas.
18,223 (W.D.
Wash. 1963).
63. In Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1961), where a local union
submitted forty-seven proposed constitutional changes under one heading, thus providing for only one general vote, the court held that section 101 (a) (1) was "enforceable . . . by the membership . . . to insure that ballots for referendums are submitted
in a suitable form." Id. at 917. In Kolmonen v. Hod Carriers Local 1191, 215 F.
Supp. 703 (W.D. Mich. 1963), where only one polling place was established for an
entire statewide area, this was held to be a violation of section 101 (a) (1). No relief
was granted however since the election challenged had already been held, the court
Published
Villanova
Charles
Widgerpost-election
School of Law remedies.
Digital Repository, 1967
ruling by
that
Title University
IV provided
exclusive
64. See Coleman v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1965).
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effect of section 101 (a) (1) is its ability to check intra-union gerrymandering.
Vestal v. International Bhd. of Teamsters" provides a classic
example. In Vestal the local Teamster union was composed of "freighters" and "non-freighters." 6 Upon receiving a petition requesting
that the "freighters" be granted a charter of their own, the General
Executive Board of the International directed that an election be held
among the "freighters" only. The district court, after finding no basis
in the International's constitution for such a limited vote, 7 held that
the "non-freighters" were being deprived of their right to the equal
vote accorded them by the International's constitution, and declared
the referendum null and void.
Where voting participation is in accord with union bylaws, however, there is a strong presumption of its legality even if it disenfranchises a section of the union's membership. In Cleveland Orchestra
Comm. v. Musicians, Local 468 the union's bylaws provided that symphony musicians were to be paid according to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated on their behalf by the union. The
symphony musicians themselves had no direct vote on whether to accept
or reject their contract. Other musicians in the union, however, who
worked on a short engagement basis, were paid under a wage scale
which they individually negotiated. When the symphony musicians
sued to enjoin the union from entering into another long-term contract because of their inability to ratify or reject, the court dismissed
their action and held that "the statute does not require or provide that
members of a labor organization have the right to vote on the business
of negotiating, executing, and approving contracts of employment, unless
[it] become[s] the business of a membership meeting." 69 Since
the bylaws of the Federation did not provide for a ratification vote,
since the contract was never the subject of business at any meetings,
and, even more importantly, since the court found no lack of fair
representation, plaintiffs were entitled to no relief under section
101 (a) (1).7 0
65. 245 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Tenn. 1965). See generally Atleson, A Union
Members Right of Free Speech and Assembly: Institutional Interests and Individual
Rights, 51 MINN. L. Rv. 403 (1967).
66. A "freighter" was, quite simply, one who worked "in the freight industry."
245 F. Supp. at 624.
67. The court expressly refused to rule on the validity of a limited vote if
authorized by the union's constitution.
68. 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962).
69. Id. at 233.
70. See also American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964)
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. Arnold v. Meat Cutters Local
653A, 52 CCH Lab. Gas. 16,663 (D. Minn. 1965).
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In general, therefore, so long as a union's bylaws and constitution
are not discriminatory7 1 and are applied as written, section 101 (a) (1)
will provide no authorization for judicial intervention. Since "[g] eneral
supervision of unions by the courts [does] not contribute to the betterment of the unions or their members or to the cause of labor-management relations," 72 this is an acceptable result. For although the authors
of Title I undoubtedly envisioned a wider range of application than the
Title presently has, it is doubtful that they would have approved of
anything more intensive in the voting-representation area than is allowed by Vestal and Cleveland Orchestra.Lack of jurisdictional scope,73
not substantive depth, is the key criticism of post-Calhoon Title I.
2.

Right to Attend and Participateat Union Meetings

While not of great independent significance, section 101 (a) ( 1)'s
guarantee of the right to attendance and participation at union meetings
does effectively concretize what otherwise would have been impliedly
drawn from Title I's "free speech and assembly" guarantees. This is,
however, of significant value, for assuming the existence of the right,
its applications are obvious. It provides no right to have meetings
called or held at specific times,74 but is addressed solely to procedures
at meetings when called. The union's right to exercise reasonable control to maintain order at its meetings is, of course, left unaffected by the
Act. Thus where a union officer refused to entertain a motion which
had been defeated for a second time just one month previously, the
75
refusal was held to be a justified exercise of parliamentary procedure.
Conversely, a union's failure to maintain proper order can also constitute a violation of section 101 (a) (1) .76 In fact, laxity in this respect
has unfortunately resulted in saddling this guarantee with the dubious
distinction of having its provisions frequently enforced under section
610, 77 the LMRDA's criminal arm.71 In short, therefore, this sub71. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Local 25, Book Binders, 196 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), where the union unreasonably created special classes of voting rights so as to
deprive a large segment of the local of proper representation.
72. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964).
73. It is still uncertain, but highly doubtful, whether Title I suits may be filed
after an election has been conducted. O'Brien v. Paddock, 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
16,838

(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
74. Blassie v. Poole, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 19,510 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
75. Broomer v. Schultz, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,526 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
76. In Allen v. Local 92, Iron Workers, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,697 (N.D. Ala.
1960), a local union was found to have violated the rights of two of its members by
failing to maintain order while they spoke and by threatening one member with
physical harm.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1964) ; see note 33 supra.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Bertucci, 333 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub
Published
by Villanova
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of Law; Digital
noin., Doherty
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379Widger
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UnitedRepository,
States v.1967
Roganovich,
318 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1963).
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section simply provides for a correlative right-duty implementation
of parliamentary procedure at union meetings.
C.

Freedom of Speech and Assembly

The guarantee of "freedom of speech and assembly" is the cornerstone of Title I. These freedoms have been aptly described as "the nerve
centres of the democratic process. . . ."" Without them, regardless
of the technical success of any other aspect of a program of legislated
democracy, there can be no realistic embodiment of the democratic
spirit. As originally drafted,"0 speech and assembly were the subjects
of separate guarantees - and were absolute. Subsequent amendments,
however, joined them and provided that labor organizations might,
in certain instances, restrict them." While this promoted fears among
some legislators that the guarantees would thereby be rendered ineffectual,"2 these fears have proven groundless in light of the liberal
judicial interpretation which section 101(a) (2) has received.
One of the primary areas of application for section 101 (a) (2)
is that of libel and slander of union officials by members. In Salzhandler
v. Caputo,"8 plaintiff, the financial secretary of a local union issued a
newsletter in which he accused the union's president of being, among
other things, a "petty robber." 4 The president then filed charges with
the District Council alleging that plaintiff had libeled him and had committed "acts . .. inconsistent with the duties, obligations and fealty
of a member or officer of the Brotherhood."8 5 The District Council's
Trial Board found plaintiff guilty as charged and suspended his voting
and participation rights for five years. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit
79. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODERN L. Riv.
273, 286 (1962). See generally Atleson, supra note 65.
80. 105 CONG. Rtc. 6475 (1959) ; see S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101 (3)-(4)

(1959).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1964) reads:

Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble
freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;
and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates
in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining
to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to
impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules
as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution
and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of
its legal or contractual obligations.
This proviso was deemed necessary since "[d]issent in a union, like treason within a
nation, must be suppressed if the purpose is to destroy the union, encourage a rival,
or bring about the violation of legal or contractual obligations." Cox, Internal Affairs
of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MiCe. L. Rev. 819,
834-35 (1960).
82. See, e.g., remarks of Senator Goldwater, in 105 CONG. REc. 6722 (1959).
83. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
84. Id. at 447.
85. Id. at 448.
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in the federal district court alleging a violation of his right to "free
speech." The district court dismissed the complaint holding that Title I
did not include the right of a union member to libel or slander officers
of the union."6 The court of appeals reversed and held that plaintiff
"had a right to speak his mind and spread his opinion regarding the
union officers, regardless of whether his statements were true or false."8 "
The court emphasized that if unions were free to punish members for
offences of such a nature, section 101 (a) (2) would be effectively emasculated since union officials were almost always likely to view criticism
of their management as defamatory. It further found that neither of
the authorized exceptions to the congressional guarantee were applicable
since the statements were never claimed to have interfered with any of
the union's legal or contractual relationships and since it was clearly
"in the interest of proper and honest management of union affairs to
permit members to question" their official's management.8 8 Subsequent
decisions have even further amplified the near absolute scope of this
"free speech guarantee." Thus in Cole v. Hall,89 where plaintiff was
found guilty of "malicious vilification" of union officials, the court held
that Salzhandler applied, the presence of malice notwithstanding.
Attacks by members on union policy and procedures have likewise
been protected. In Farowitz v. Local 802, Associated Musicians,9"
plaintiff claimed that a union tax was "unlawful" and, in a newsletter,
urged his fellow members not to pay it. After being expelled from the
union as a result of these activities, plaintiff filed a Title I suit claiming that his right of free speech had been abridged. In finding the
union's actions unjustified, the district court held that even if plaintiff's
conduct had violated union rules, such rules, insofar as they precluded
dissenting views as to revenue questions, were unreasonable and not
within the scope of section 101(a) (2)'s proviso, which allows the
adoption of reasonable regulations requiring loyalty to the union. 91
While it has been suggested that free speech may be somewhat
curbed during the critical moments of contract negotiation, in the
86. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 199 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
87. 316 F.2d at 451. This is true even where pamphlets are distributed to nonmembers, including supervisors and the public at large. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965). This is consistent with the announced legislative purpose of the Act to guarantee "freedom of speech not only in a
union hall, but outside." Remarks of Senator McClellan, in 105 CONG. REc. 6718
(1959) ; see Graham v. Soloner, 48 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 18,498 (E.D. Pa. 1963). These
decisions, of course, in no way immunize union members from civil liability for their
statements. 316 F.2d at 451.
88. 316 F.2d at 450. Accord, Stark v. Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council, 219
F. Supp. 528 (D. Minn. 1963).
89. 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965).
90. 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; cf. Farowitz v. Local 802, Associated
Musicians,
330 F.2dUniversity
999 (2d Charles
Cir. 1964).
Published
by Villanova
Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
91. Accord, Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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absence of the prior adoption and announcement of such a limitation

none will be allowed."2 Thus, aside from basic limitations of parliamentary procedure,9 3 section 101 (a) (2), for all practical purposes, provides an absolute guarantee of free speech, and the scope of its limiting
proviso has been construed so narrowly that it does not weaken its
effect.9 4 While the full empirical results of the guarantee are yet to
be determined, it can be stated that it is doubtful whether any better
legislative measures could have been devised.
D. Regulation of Union Dues Procedures
Section 101 (a) (3),95 the least controversial section in Title I,9"
establishes detailed procedural regulations for the increasing of dues
and the levying of fees upon members.97 Whether proceeding by formal
referendum or in membership meetings,98 local unions seeking additional
revenue are required to obtain, by secret ballot,9 9 a majority vote of their
voting members in good standing. 10 International unions,' if they
choose to proceed by referendum, must also meet the same require92. Leonard v. M.I.T. Employee's Union, 225 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964).
93. See, e.g., Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1964).
94. Perhaps the best postulation as to where the proviso would be applicable is
that of Professor Summers:
A member who urged a "wildcast strike" could be expelled by the union for
"conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual
obligation." Urging workers to return to work during a strike probably violates
"the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution,"
but advocating that a strike be called off is probably protected even though it
weakens the union's will and ability to resist. Joining or supporting a rival
union probably can be punished, but organizing an opposition group to work
within the processes of the union is within the protected right.
Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODERN L. Riv. 273,
286-87 (1962) ; see Deacon v. Operating Eng'rs Local 112, CCH Lab. Cas. ff 16,605
(S.D. Cal. 1965). It has in fact been held that a threat of job discrimination by a
union in order to prevent members from organizing and seeking a separate local
charter for their geographical area constituted a violation of the right of free assembly.
Johnson v. Local 58, Elec. Workers, 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1960) ; see Vestal
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 245 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1964).
96. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 HARV. L. Rnv. 851, 860-61, 863 (1960) ; Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill
of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REv. 211-13 (1960).
97. No attempt has been made to specify maximum charges. But see 105 CONG.
Ric. 6475 (1959).
98. Reasonable notice of the intention to vote upon dues questions must be given
to the membership before all such meetings. Brown v. United Bhd. of Carpenters,
52 CCH Lab. Cas.
16,519 (D. Kan. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 343 F.2d 872
(10th Cir. 1965); Allen v. Local 92, Iron Workers, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,697
(N.D. Ala. 1960).
99. A standing vote will not suffice. Brown v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 52
CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,519 (D. Kan. 1964). Furthermore, the ballot must be clearly
worded. Brooks v. Local 30, United Roofers Workers, 187 F. Supp. 365 (E.D.
Pa. 1960).
100. Traveling members of international federations, however, are not entitled to
vote in local elections concerning "work dues equivalents" imposed on them as a
"service charge" for being allowed to work in the local's area. Zentner v. Musicians
Local 802, 237 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiain, 343 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
101. The regulations actually apply to allnon-local unions.
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ments. However, no secret ballot is required where the vote is among
convention" 2 delegates.'
Alternatively, if expressly authorized, members of international executive boards may increase dues or levy fees,
but their action will be effective only until the next regular convention.' 4
In the one area of possible conflict between these prov isions, it has
been held that if an international union validly enacts "[a]n acrossthe-board increase in dues to be paid by its members to its affiliated
local unions, [it may] bind its local unions by that action without
submitting the question of the dues increase to a referendum of the
locals' members."' 10 5
E. Protection of the Right to Sue
Section 101 (a) (4)..6 provides that "no labor organization shall

limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any
court" or before any administrative agency even where the union or
its officers "are named as defendants.' 1 °7 This right is limited, however,
in that "any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four month lapse of time) within
such organization before instituting" suit. 0 8
This granting of a "right to sue," in and of itself, is not significant.
Generally speaking, even prior to the LMRDA, there was little support
for its absolute denial. On the other hand, it was freely admitted that
"freedom of litigation ...

is hardly so essential a part of the democratic

process that the courts should be asked to strike down all hindrances
102. If the convention is a "special" one, "not less than 30 days written notice to
the principal office of each local or constituent labor organization entitled to such
notice" must be given. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (3) (B) (1964).
103. Weighted voting, that is where each delegate votes according to the per capita
membership of his unit, is permissible. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein,

379 U.S. 171, 179 (1964).

104. General grants of "all executive, legislative and judiciary powers" are not a
sufficient authorization. King v. Randazzo, 346 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1965).
105. Ranes v. Office Employees Local 28, 317 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1963). See
also Jennette v. Ammons, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 16,804 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964). Its antecedents include: S. 1555, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 101(a)(4) (1959); cf. S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b) (1959);
H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (4) (1959). But see, e.g., H.R. 8490, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(4) (1959).
107. It also guarantees the "right of any member of a labor organization to appear
as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition
any legislature or to communicate with any legislator . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (4)
(1964).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964). A proviso to this section requires that "no
interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action.......
29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(4) (1964). Designed to check the possibility of employer sponsored union
harassment, it has been liberally construed by the courts. Thus the limiting term
"interested," which was inserted primarily to enable union members to obtain bank
financing for their litigation (105 CONG. RiC. 6724-25 (1959)), has been defined to
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles
Widger
of Law
allow the
involvement
of other
classes
of School
employers
asDigital
well. Repository,
Farowitz 1967
v. Associated
Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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to its pursuit."' 9 Thus section 101(a) (4) assumes importance not
insofar as it grants a right, but rather because of the manner in which
it defines and limits it. In short, the heart of section 101 (a) (4) lies
in its exhaustion proviso.
1.

The Union-Court Question
Unfortunately this exhaustion proviso is more ambiguous than

perhaps any other provision in the LMRDA."n

It does not define its

scope and is devoid of any consistent legislative history which might
indicate its precise purpose."'

More specifically, it totally fails to

clarify the nature of its relationship to the two distinct exhaustion of
remedies limitations which are relevant to union members' civil suits.
The first of these limitations derives from union constitutional provisions ;112 the second is an independent judicial doctrine 113 administered
pursuant to flexible common law standards."

4

If the proviso is directed

only to "union" limitations, unions may require exhaustion for four
months while the courts, applying the common law, may independently
either require or waive exhaustion during that period and also, when
109. Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50

YALE L.J. 621, 630 (1941).
110. See Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members Under Title I and
Section 610 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 52 GEo. L.J. 339, 350 (1964).

111. Compare remarks of Senator Kennedy, in 105 CONe. REc. 17899 (1959) with
remarks of Senator Cooper, in 105 CONrG. REc. 17870 (1959) and remarks of Rep.

Griffin, in 105 CONG. REc. 18152 (1959) ; cf. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions
under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicnI. L. REv. 819, 841 (1960) ; O'Donoghue,
Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 14

U.L. REv. 215, 223-34 (1965). Congress was apparently more concerned
with the establishment of specific time limitations for tie proviso than it was in
clarifying its substantive effects. Thus, for example, the floor debates reflect great
fears that the six month amendment of the Kuchel amendment, 105 CONG. REc. 6693
(1959), might effectively deny union members access to the NLRB by reason of
section 10(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act which established a six month statute of
limitations for the filing of unfair labor practice charges. This use of the relatively
short congressional time available for discussion of the proviso was unfortunate since,
for all practical purposes, it was generally recognized that "the doctrine of exhaustion
of internal remedies [was] simply inapplicable to the Labor Board proceedings or
remedies." Remarks of Rep. McCormack, in 105 CONG. REc. 15835 (1959) ; cf.
remarks of Senator Griffin, in 105 CONG. REc. 18152 (1959).
112. In 1950, some 66 of 154 international union constitutions, over 42%, required
members to exhaust their intra-union appeals before resorting to the courts. Summers,
Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. RE. REv. 483, 503 (1950).
CATnoLIC

113. Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46

L. REV. 195, 206 (1960). Obviously, however, if there are no internal union
remedies, no exhaustion can be required. Annots., 87 A.L.R.2d 1099, 1107 (1963)
Annots., 168 A.L.R. 1462, 1477 (1947).

VA.

114. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 993 (1930) ; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv.
1049, 1086-92 (1951); Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intra-Union Remedies, 2 LAB. L.J.

487 (1951).
Most commentators have agreed that the exhaustion doctrine, though procedural in format, was and is but a judicial foil to be used in determining substantive
results. See articles cited supra. Put another way, they have, with much justification,
accused the courts of using the substantive facts before them as a basis upon which
to either request or waive exhaustion rather than merely acting on the basis of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
compliance with procedural requirements.
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appropriate, extend it further. On the other hand, if the proviso is interpreted as applying either to the courts or to both the courts and
unions, it will, in effect, be "in lieu of the common law""' 5 and preclude
the requiring of any exhaustion whatsoever after the expiration of four
months."'
In the interpretative donnybrook which followed the passage of the
LMRDA, both conceptual views received academic and judicial support.
The "union only" thesis, most strongly urged by Professor Cox,"1
emphasized a literal reading of the statute. Noting that section
101(a) (4) reads "no labor organization" shall limit any member's
right to sue -

in no way referring to the courts -

Cox argued that

both logic and consistency required that the proviso also be restricted
to unions in its application." 8 Furthermore, since the imposition of a
four month limitation on the courts would attribute to Congress the
intention of modifying state exhaustion laws insofar as Title I rights are
enforceable in state courts, he urged that such an interpretation would
be unrealistic since "it seems unlikely that Congress would so lightly
sweep away state rules of judicial administration.""" Unfortunately,
despite its apparent merit, 20 this view has, until just recently, met
with limited judicial success.' 21 In the landmark case of Detroy v.
115. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. Riv. 1435,

1456 (1963).
116. Despite the controversy which arose in determining the precise length of this
statutory period and the confusion which exists concerning its scope, it was generally
conceded that "some date must be set" in order to effectively protect the "right to
sue." Remarks of Senator McClellan, in 105 CONG. RFc. 6479 (1959).
117. See A. Cox, LAW AND THA NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 103-06 (1960) ; Cox,
Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L.
REv. 819, 840 (1960).
118. While not irrefutable, see Blumrosen, supra note 115, at 1456, this line of
reasoning is certainly persuasive. See Mamula v. United Steelworkers Local 1211,
414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d 306, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 17 (1964).
119. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MICH. L. Rtv. 819, 840 (1960). The practical significance of this argument may
be challenged in that there have been few state court suits seeking enforcement of
Title I rights. Moreover, while Cox put forth four points in support of his analysis,
two have not withstood the test of time. Even under a "court's" interpretation, unions
have not been allowed to discipline members for filing "premature" NLRB charges.
See note 134 infra. Nor has the collective bargaining process been disrupted. See
Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
120. This analysis is supported by what is undoubtedly the most articulate legislative statement of intent on the issue:
Nor is it the intent or purpose of the provision to invalidate the considerable
body of State and Federal court decisions of many years standing which require,
or do not require, the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention
depending upon the reasonableness of such requirements in terms of the facts and
circumstances of a particular case.
Remarks of Senator Kennedy, in 105 CoNG. REc. 17899 (1959).
121. See Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion) ; Mamula v. United Steelworkers Local 1211, 414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d
306 (1964);
Industrial
Union
of Marine
v. NLRB,
379 F.2d 1967
702 (3d Cir.
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Charles
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1967). See also p. 22 infra.
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American Guild of Variety Artists,1 22 the Second Circuit, relying on
its interpretation of "statements made on the floor of Congress by the
authors of the statute," construed the proviso "to mean that a member
of a labor union who attempts to institute proceedings before a court or
an administrative agency may be required by that court or agency
to exhaust internal remedies of less than four months ... .
This profession of adherence to legislative history is unjustified, 2 '
and particularly unfortunate, insofar as it leaves the policy considerations upon which it is based unenunciated. The assertion that such
an interpretation was necessary "lest it otherwise appear to be Congress'
intention to have the right to sue secured by § 101 abrogate the requirement of prior resort to internal procedures"' 5 as developed in the
courts, is difficult to comprehend. 12 ' The Cox approach would preserve
the judicial doctrine of exhaustion by merely reading section 101 (a) (4)
as unrelated to it.' 27 Detroy, in its misguided attempt to preserve the

principle, emasculated it. Under its analysis, judicial exhaustion is
"read into" section 101(a) (4) and branded with a mandatory four
month limitation which cannot be extended. 2 This has the effect of
obviating the flexibility of the common law doctrine which would otherwise be able to require exhaustion beyond four months. While the
immediate practical effects of this limitation have been few, they are
disturbing. For example, at least one district court has required
exhaustion beyond the four month period where the exhaustion period
was marked by delays occasioned by the plaintiff's own conduct. 2
The decision is inconsistent with Detroy and is therefore questionable
law. The result reached by the district court is preferable, however, and
exemplifies the anomalous result that Detroy calls for.
122. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).
123. Id. at 78.
124. See note 111 supra.
125. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1961).
126. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
127. In Mamula v. United Steelworkers Local 1211, 414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d
306 (1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that even though section
101 (a) (4) was not directed at the judicial doctrine of exhaustion, its four month
proviso might be "adopted" as a guide in the administration of the common law.
Such an approach preserves the common law yet remains consistent with the announced congressional intent of establishing some definite termination point for exhaustion requirements. See note 116 supra.
128. By adopting this position, the Detroy court was forced to construe section
101(a) (4)'s exhaustion proviso as applicable to all of Title I. While the court's
insistence on reading the proviso as applicable to the judicial doctrine of exhaustion
rendered this construction necessary, it is, to say the least, strained. The House of
Representatives had previously rejected a provision in section 102 providing for an
exhausting of internal remedies for all Title I rights, perhaps from a realization that
this was unnecessary because the common law of exhaustion would be left unaffected
by Title I. See H.R. 8432, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
129. Carroll v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 235 F. Supp. 161, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) ; see McCraw v. Journeymen of Plumbing Local 43, 216 F. Supp. 655 (D. Tenn.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
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In view of Detroy's emphasis upon the role of the judiciary
in the administration of the exhaustion principle, it would appear
that it was not legislative history but rather fear of union discipline
which prompted the decision. More specifically, it would seem that the
court, sceptical of both the vitality and effectiveness of its common
law authority, feared that unless it assumed at least concurrent statutory
jurisdiction over the exhaustion area it would be precluded from any
intervention and unable to effectively check union attempts, based on
express statutory authorization, to discourage members' civil suits
with threats of internal sanctions. These fears were groundless. The
continued vitality of the judicial doctrine of exhaustion had been frequently asserted during the course of congressional debates.13 Certainly there was no authority which required its demise. Likewise,
though dotted with exceptions, its effectiveness had still met with congressional commendation. 8 ' Assuredly it provided no less effective a
judicial tool than that currently available under Detroy's limited four
3 2
month period of exhaustion.
Furthermore, even apart from its common law ability to circumscribe union abuse, it would seem that the court had little to fear
in adopting a "union only" analysis. Section 101 (a) (4) expressly forbade all union limitations on their members' rights to sue except to
the extent authorized in its proviso. Thus instead of forcing the
common law into the LMRDA, the court simply could have interpreted the proviso to allow unions to require exhaustion while at the
same time retaining enforcement powers for the judiciary.'13 Under
such an interpretation, even assuming the non-existence of an independent common law of exhaustion, courts would still have had control
over potential union abuse.
At first glance, there would seem to be little difference between
those situations in which a union requires exhaustion and where as now,
courts alone do."3 In each instance, disciplinary and enforcement powers
reside in the courts. Where the courts act to enforce union regula130. See note 120 supra.

131. See, e.g., remarks of Rep. Thompson, in 105 CoNG. Rtc. 15536-37 (1959)

cf. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Rev. 1049, 1086-92

(1951).

Referred to by Senator Kennedy, in 105

CONG.

Rgc. 6486-87 (1959).

132. See pp. 23-25 infra.

133. But see Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 99 (1963).
134. Although Detroy does not expressly preclude union regulations, it certainly

does so impliedly. Subsequent cases, while likewise not formally prohibiting such
requirements, have rendered them nugatory and viewed the rule as strictly "one of

judicial administration." Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
accord, Ryan v. Electrical Workers Local 134, 241 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ill. 1965), aff'd,
361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1966). But see Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB,
Published
by Villanova
379 F.2d
702 (3d University
Cir. 1967).Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
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tions, however, as opposed to where they are merely administering
judicial doctrines, they presumably will be much more reluctant
to waive exhaustion lest they undermine the raison d'etre of
such union regulations. Under this latter approach, therefore, there
would be greater encouragement of internal union processes, thus preventing their "atrophy" from lack of exercise. 3 ' The significance of
the preservation of such internal union procedures was, in fact, recently
strongly reaffirmed by the Third Circuit in its decision in Industrial
Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB.' Judge Hastie, writing for the
court, rejected the Detroy rationale in its entirety and adopted the
views of Professor Cox. 1 7 Quoting from his concurring opinion in
Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters,3 ' Judge Hastie specifically held
that section 101 (a) (4) means "that a union may not restrict a member's resort to the courts except that it may require that the member
first devote not more than four months to reasonable grievance procedures within the organization."' 89 Certainly welcome and long overdue
in its holding, 14 the significance of this case is difficult to predict.
Judge Hastie had expressed himself in this vein previously, however,
his views found no judicial support. Whether the addition of Judges
Seitz and Body to his camp will prove effectual in this Detroydominated area, only time will tell.
In summary, therefore, under either aspect' 4 ' of the "union"
analysis, section 101 (a) (4) can be read as not affecting the common
law of exhaustion, except to the extent that courts "adopt" its fourmonth limitation as a working guideline. 4 2 Judicial discretion would be
maintained and constructional inconsistencies avoided. Under Detroy's
"court" approach, however, by drawing the common law through sec143
tion 101 (a) (4), union limitations have been rendered nugatory
and, outside of four-month periods, judicial discretion eliminated.
2.

Judicial Administration Within the FourMonth Barrier

Even under Detroy's limited view of the judicial doctrine of exhaustion which prevents a court from requiring exhaustion after the
135. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,

73 HARV. L. Rtv. 851, 869 (1960).
136. 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967).
137. See pp. 19-20 supra.
138. 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962).
139. 379 F.2d at 708.
140. More precisely, this interpretation represents an alternative holding on the
part of the court.

141. The "union analysis" includes both the union regulation-union enforcement
and union regulation-court enforcement approaches.
142. See note 127 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1

143. See note 134 supra.
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four month period, there is still a four month period in which it is
actively operative as a discretionary device enabling the court to take
jurisdiction prior to the expiration of the four month period, even if
there has not in fact been exhaustion."' In the establishment of standards for the exercise of this discretionary power, federal courts have
been forced to create new "federal law" which, while borrowing heavily
from the prior common law, is at least pro forma distinct from it. Thus
under Detroy "where the internal union remedy is uncertain and has not
been specifically brought to the attention of the disciplined party, the
violation of federal law clear and undisputed, and the injury to the
union member immediate and difficult to compensate by means of a
subsequent money award, exhaustion of remedies ought not to be
1 45
required.'
While Detroy indicated that the presence of all these factors might
be necessary to waive exhaustion, subsequent courts have been less strict
in their requirements and have shown themselves to be amenable to
common law influence. They have therefore generally granted relief
after finding just one of these factors present.
Under the common law, no exhaustion could be required where
there were no internal union remedies available. 4 6 Analogously related
to this obvious principle is the "federal law" rule that no exhaustion
is required where there is no "certain" remedy. For example, where
a union member was placed on an "unfair" list for refusing to comply
with an arbitration award, his union's constitution contained no provisions dealing with appeals from such a listing, and his union never
specifically notified him that any relief was available, 4 7 the degree of
certainty comprehended by the federal rule would be lacking. In the
absence of either a clear remedy or notice as to those of a more obscure
nature, the court waived the requirement of exhaustion.141 While there
certainly is no requirement that union constitutions delineate a specific
144. Some early courts read section 101 (a) (4) as requiring mandatory exhaustion
in all cases. See, e.g., Mendez v. District Council for Ports, 208 F. Supp. 917 (D.P.R.
1962); Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Smith v. General Truck Drivers Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
However, it is now generally accepted that exhaustion "may be required," but not
necessarily so. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78 (2d
Cir. 1961).
145. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1961).
146. Annots., supra note 113.
147. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).
148. See also Allen v. International Alliance of Stage Employees, 338 F.2d 309
(5th Cir. 1964) ; Associated Orchestra Leaders v. Local 71, Musicians, 203 F. Supp.
755 (E.D.
Pa. 1962)
; Johnson
v. Widger
Local School
58, Elec.
Workers,
181 F. Supp.
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remedy for every possible offense, 4 9 the burden of proof is on the union
to demonstrate its clear availability.' 50
Although the relevance of a "clear violation of federal law" in
creating an exhaustion "exception" has been challenged on the grounds
that "it is all the more imperative" that a union be allowed to "put its
own house in order . . . where the violation is clear,"''

the courts

have refused to abandon this rule.' 52 The clearer the violation, the less
reason there is for judicial hesitation. "[T]he committment of judicial
resources is not great; the risk of misconstruing procedures unfamiliar
to the court is slight; [and] .

.

. a sufficient remedy given by the union

tribunal would have to approximate that offered by the court." 5 3 In
short, where the course is clear, the courts have found it to be of little
54
significance who pursues it.'

Where it is obvious that a union's internal remedies, although
available, are futile, the courts have refused to require their exhaustion.
A perfunctory exercise of formal rights by a union member will effect
no positive results and, on the contrary, may prove quite damaging to
him. In Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, "' for example,
plaintiff was not required to exhaust his remedies because the union
admittedly considered him an "exceptional threat" to its operations and
had treated him severely before, because he was bitterly and outspokenly
hated by a member of the union's appeals board,'5 6 and because the
union had adamantly assumed a fixed position on the dues issue out
of which plaintiff's case arose.
On the other hand, a mere unsubstantiated allegation of bias or
futility will ordinarily not suffice; there must be some "actual resort to
149. In Denov v. Davis, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 19,449 (N.D. Ill. 1964), dimissed
on merits, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,421 (N.D. Ill. 1966), where plaintiffs challenged
the legality of a union tax assessment which their local had found valid, a provision
in the International's Constitution providing that members might appeal "any decision,
of whatever kind, of a Local or any other authority" was held sufficient to require
intra-union exhaustion. Id. at 32,983.
150. Thomas v. Penn Supply & Metal Corp., 49 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 18,924 (E.D.
Pa. 1964) ; Forline v. Local 42, Marble Polishers, 211 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
151. Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members Under Title I and Section 610
of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 52 Go. L.J. 339, 353 (1964).
152. This exception is quite similar to the common law's "void" concept. See, e.g.,
Tesoriero v. Miller, 274 App. Div. 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949).
153. Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 337 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1964); accord, Simmons v.
Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
154. Cf. Hopkins v. Daley, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 16,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where
plaintiff, a union officer, moved for an order reinstating him as president of his local
union. The court found that "the violation of the federal law was not clear" and refused
to waive exhaustion. Id. at 23,194.
155. 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
156. In Calagoz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1962), the court stated: "The
plaintiffs are not compelled to exhaust the internal remedies of their union when their
appeal would have to be made to the very officers against whom their complaint is
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
directed." Id. at 260. See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944) ; Caraballo v. Union de Operadores, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 18,784 (D.P.R. 1964).
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such procedures."' 57 A flat refusal to exercise reasonable procedures
will result in an exhaustion-based dismissal. 5 ' Furthermore, there need
be no guarantee of obtaining a final decision within the four month
period.
As long as there is likelihood that some decision will be forthcoming within the four-month period and the aggrieved member
has not shown that he will be harmed by being required to seek
such a decision . . . the purposes of the Act require that judicial

intervention be withheld until the member has given the internal
grievance procedures the chance to operate which Congress has
deemed to be reasonable. 15 9
Thus unless it is patently clear that a plaintiff will be unable to find
adequate internal relief because of improperly constituted appeal boards,
open hostility towards him, or an inability to obtain any appellate
decision within four months, he will not be allowed to escape his
exhaustion requirement on the basis of a claim of "futility."
Finally, where a plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm by being
forced to exercise his union remedies, courts will not require exhaustion.
Although this "exception" generally assumes only dependent significance
and is extremely narrow in scope, 160 in certain cases it may independently provide a basis for waiving exhaustion - or the granting of a
temporary injunction. This is particularly true where a member has
been suspended or expelled and, as a result, is suffering damages which
will be difficult to compensate with money - either because of the
uncertainty of measuring damages' 61 or the general ineffectiveness of
a money award.'6 2
157. McKeon v. Local 107, Teamsters, 223 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Del. 1963) ; see
19,040 (D. Wyo. 1964).
Kuykendall v. Local 1763, Carpenters, 49 CCH Lab. Cas.
1966), where plaintiffs
236
F.
Supp.
317
(S.D.N.Y.
158. In Armondo v. Urbach,
were accused by their union of distributing false statements concerning a proposed
merger, their allegations of futility were "negatived" by the Executive Board's dismissal of the charges against three of their group who had exercised internal remedies.
159. Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 129, 321 F.2d 801, 805
(3d Cir. 1963); accord, McKeon v. Local 107, Teamsters, 223 F. Supp. 341 (D.
Del. 1963).
160. For example, in Acevedo v. Bookbinders Local 25, 196 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), the court held that a mere "temporary continuance of a deprivation of" full
voting rights did not constitute irreparable harm.
161. Where "eventual reinstatement and full back pay" are available, a plaintiff
is obliged to make a strong showing that irreparable harm will result if he is not
afforded immediate relief. See Hopkins v. Daley, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,543, at
23,195 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
162. In Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963), where plaintiff
was fined and suspended from membership in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (2)
(1964), his suspension was enjoined since the court found that plaintiff's right to
participate in impending shop contract negotiations would be irreparably harmed
unless immediate relief were given. Cf. Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Published
Villanova
University
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
314 by
F.2d
886 (4th
Cir. 1963).
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On the whole, therefore, even under Detroy, the judicial exhaustion principle has been developing on an ad hoc basis with little change
from the common law except for the imposition of a four-month limitation as the outside measure of its application. Whatever its intended
goals, Detroy would seem to have done little except to circumscribe
the courts and encourage the atrophy of internal union remedies. For,
where union members are at all unsure of their chances before their
peers, they have little reason to pursue their internal remedies energetically since they are aware that within four months, full and impartial civil relief will be automatically available to them.
F.

Safeguards Against Improper Disciplinary Action

Section 101(a)(5) provides that "[n]o member of any labor
organization may be fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined
except for non-payment of dues .

.

. unless such member has been (A)

served with specific written charges; (B) given a reasonable time to
prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.""'s' Notably
brief in its format, this provision was chosen over several more detailed
versions because of its flexibility.' 64 Aside from the theoretical justification which it provides for judicial intervention, 6 5 however, it "adds
nothing to the standard of fair procedure long enforced by the
courts."' 6 Therefore, although this justification has had the salutary
effect of rendering the courts more aggressive in their administration
of fair standards, section 101 (a) (5) itself has done little to correct
the source of most disciplinary malfeasance, the union trial board. 6
It in no way requires, for example, the use of non-union members as
judges.1'6
1.

The "Otherwise Disciplined" Limitation

In order for section 101 (a) (5)'s guarantees to become applicable,
a union member must be either fined, suspended, expelled, or "otherwise disciplined."' 9 The first three instances are obvious, but the latter
163. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1964).
164. See, e.g., H.R. 4473, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (7) (1959) ; H.R. 7265,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20(6) (1959) ; S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(7) (1959).
165. See Aaron, supra note 135, at 873.
166. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODERN L. Riv.
273, 288 (1962). See also Cox, supra note 119, at 838.
167. Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. RtL. Riv. 15
(1950).
168. The United Auto Workers, in 1957, established a "Public Review Board"
composed of non-union members to which internal appeals could be taken. See
Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review: Some Reflections, 58 McH. L. Rtv. 55 (1959).

169. Section 101 (a) (5) is not applicable to removals of union officers from their

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
positions. See note 31 supra.
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a substantial body of interpretative case law which
according to whether the union activity involved has
employment 7 ° or membership itself.
American Guild of Variety Artists,'7 ' plaintiff was

placed on a "national unfair list" for failing to comply with an arbitration award and, as a result, lost several job opportunities. The court
found that the union's indirect enforcement of the arbitration award

was in its own interests and therefore constituted "discipline" within
the meaning of section 101 (a) (5). On the other hand, in Figueroa v.
National Maritime Union,172 the defendant union refused to refer
plaintiffs for work since, as convicted drug offenders, they were
ineligible under the terms of the collective bargaining contract which
bound the union. In dismissing plaintiffs' complaint the court held that
it was clear that "the Union's conduct did not amount to 'discipline' "
since it was pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

173

There seems to be little reason for this difference in result. In
each case the union was seeking to compel its members to comply with
the terms of employment for which they had either directly or indirectly
contracted. In each instance the members admitted their contract violations.17 4 If for no other reason than the peculiar nature of its industry,
the American Guild of Variety Artists had just as valid an interest
in ensuring the continued satisfaction of its employers as did the
National Maritime Union, the fact that it was not a direct obligor on
Detroy's contract notwithstanding. In each case, therefore, the combination of an admitted violation and a valid union interest in enforcement should have precluded the need for requiring section 101 (a) (5)
procedures.
In Scovile v. Watson, 75 where a union passed a bylaw stating that
it would not process for arbitration any claim made by a member
guilty of excessive absenteeism, the court held that the application of
this bylaw to plaintiff was not "discipline," since, when passed, it was
170. This area is, of course, closely related to the NLRB's section 8(b) (2) juris-

diction and creates difficult pre-emption problems. See note 29 supra.
171. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).
172. 342 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964). The court stated, however, that if plaintiffs
had denied their convictions, a factual hearing in accordance with section 101 (a) (5)
would have been required.
173. Id. at 406. Conversely, the mere fact that a union breaks a collective bargaining contract in dealing with a member does not necessarily mean that its action
constitutes "discipline." Compare Lucas v. Kenny, 220 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1963)
and Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs Local 820, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960)
with Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
174. In Figueroa,plaintiffs admitted that they had been convicted of drug offenses;
in Detroy, plaintiff, by failing to appeal from his arbitration judgment, had acquiesced
in it by
as a matter University
of law.
Published
Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
175. Villanova
338 F.2d 678 (7thCharles
Cir. 1964).
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prospective and applied to all members. However, in Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,'7 where defendant's international
president revoked the charter of a local, it was held that the revocation,
although directed at the local, so affected the membership as to constitute discipline against the members.'7 Union action that affects a whole
group rather than a specific individual, therefore, does not necessarily
excuse the necessity for due process under section 101 (a) (5).
2.

ProceduralDue Process

Once discipline has been administered,'7 8 it then becomes the
function of the courts to determine whether or not section 101 (a) (5)'s
requisite safeguards have been complied with. Initially, of course, an
accused member must have been served with "written specific
charges,"'" 9 and a mere reference to a particular section of a union's
constitution without any statement of the facts involved is insufficient.'
This requirement is absolute and "an ex post facto showing of knowledge by oral testimony" will not suffice.'
There is, furthermore,
no requirement that an accused member seek such notice; however, if
he does so successfully within a reasonable time prior to his trial,
8
the requirement of the statute is satisfied.'

2

In determining what is a "reasonable" time to prepare a defense,
the courts have necessarily proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Twenty-one
days before trial has been found acceptable ;..3 eight days has not.8 8
The short of it is that the issue will depend upon the complexity and
gravity of the charges, the adequacy of the original notice, as well as
any other factors which might justify a particularly prompt adjudication.
Questions of notice aside, the essence of section 101 (a) (5), insofar
as the courts are concerned, lies in its guarantee of a "full and fair
hearing."'8 5 This, at a minimum, requires "an unbiased and dis176. 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1963).
177. See Calabrese v. United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing, 211 F. Supp. 609
(D.N.J. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 324 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1963).
178. Until "discipline" has actually been ordered and imposed, there can be no
section 101 (a) (5) suit. Baron v. Local 173, Am. Newspaper Guild, 342 F.2d 423
(3d Cir. 1965) ; Flaherty v. United Steelworkers, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,517 (S.D.
Cal. 1960). Conversely, where a member waits until his suspension is terminated,
he may not then file a section 101 (a) (5) suit since the issue is moot. Mirra v.
Local 701, Teamsters, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 19,076 (D.N.J. 1964).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (A) (1964).
180. Magelssen v. Local 518, Plasterers, 233 F. Supp. 459 (W.D. Mo. 1964);
accord, Caraballo v. Union de Operadores, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 18,784 (D.P.R. 1964).
181. Magelssen v. Local 518, Plasterers, 233 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D. Mo. 1964),
But see Null v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
182. See Rosen v. District Council 9, Painters, 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
183. See Null v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
184. Caraballo v. Union de Operadores, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 18,784 (D.P.R. 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
185. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(C) (1964).
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interested tribunal." '
It does not require that a member have an
attorney present, 1 17 although he is entitled both to confront his accusers
and to cross examine witnesses.'8 8 He may waive these rights, however, if he fails, without justification, to attend the trial.8 9
Since substantially all proof of impropriety must come from the
trial record itself, 9" much of the litigation in this area has concerned
itself with the proper scope of judicial review. While all courts recognize that broad discretion rests with union trial boards in the admission
of evidence' 9', they have, nevertheless, not hesitated to examine findings
according to the same test applied by appellate courts in passing upon
1 92
the sufficiency of evidence to support the judgment of trial courts.
At least one court has apparently gone even further and, while
9
eschewing reevaluations of credibility or the weighing of evidence,9'
has stated that "a close reading of the record is justified to insure
that the findings are not without any foundation ....1,'Thus, although
it is certain that courts will not accept union findings as a matter of
course, it is uncertain precisely what their scope of review will be.
Section 101 (a) (5) provides quite adequate prima facie secondary
checks upon the maladministration of union discipline. It would seem,
however, that by failing to deal in the first instance with the problem
of inherent bias' 95 resultant from the union practice of combining
prosecuting and judicial functions in a single trial board, it has not
proven to be a significant refinement of the common law. An ounce
of prevention may well be worth a pound of cure, but the LMRDA has
contented itself with administering relatively standard dosages of the
latter.
186. Carroll v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 235 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
See also Barbour v. Sheet Metal Workers, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
187. Cornelio v. Carpenters' Metro. Dist. Council, 243 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa.
1965); accord, Smith v. General Truck Drivers Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.
Cal. 1960).
188. Anderson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. fr 18,400 (D.
Minn. 1963).
189. Kuykendall v. Local 1763, Carpenters, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. f 19,040 (D.
Wyo. 1964).
190. Several district courts have allowed the introduction of evidence not introduced at the union hearing. See, e.g., Leonard v. M.I.T. Employees' Union, 225 F.
Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964) ; Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp.
943 (D. Conn. 1963). The Second Circuit expressly refused to rule on the validity
of this practice in Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 320 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1963).
191. See, e.g., Robinson v. Boilermakers Local 104, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 18,223
(D.N.J. 1960).
192. Phillips v. Teamsters Local 560, 209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962); accord,
Kuykendall v. Local 1763, Carpenters, 49 CCH Lab. Cas.
19,040 (D. Wyo. 1964);
Rosen v. District Council 9, Painters, 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
193. In Leonard v. M.I.T. Employees' Union, 225 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964),
however, the court set aside a union decision because it was not supported by "substantial evidence."
Vars v.University
International
Bhd.
of Boilermakers,
320 F.2d
576 (2d1967
Cir. 1963).
Published194.
by Villanova
Charles
Widger
School of Law Digital
Repository,
195. See Summers, supra note 167.
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TITLE IV: UNION ELECTIONS

Regardless of the substantive guarantees contained in Title I's
"Bill of Rights,"' 9 6 the viability of union democracy is, as a matter of
practical administration, primarily dependent upon the attitudes and
effectiveness of union officers.' 7 As the elected representatives of the
rank and file, officers govern, conjointly with management, the full
spectrum of their electors' industrial lives. 9 It requires little argument,
therefore, "to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic union
elections" in establishing in these positions men attuned to the "freely
expressed will of the members."' 9 9 For without the benefit of such
a rapport, in the long run, union leaders can "have little prestige or
effectiveness." 2" Members, with little reason or occasion to actively
participate in union affairs, become apathetic; the officers themselves,
with disturbing frequency, tend to conform to Lord Acton's famed
maxim of power.20 ' In short, unionism stagnates. Not surprisingly,
therefore, in 1958, the McClellan Committee, after uncovering detailed
instances of union dictatorship and official self-aggrandizement, recommended the passage of federal2 °2 legislation requiring both periodic
elections and the use of the secret ballot.2" 3 After considerable reworking,20 4 these recommendations were eventually incorporated into Title
IV of the LMRDA 20 5 which prescribes minimum 2 ° 6 standards for the
full range of union electoral procedures. 0 7
196. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
197. Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221 (1961).
198. A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 93-94 (1960) ; see Summers,
American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODERN L. REv. 273, 290 (1962).
199. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong.., 1st Sess. 20 (1959). See also H. REP. No. 741,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; Jenkins, Trade Union Elections, in REGULATING UNION
GOVERNMENT 154 (Estey, Taft and Wagner ed. 1964).
200. Holcombe, Union Democracy and the LMRDA, 12 LAB. L.J. 597, 604 (1961).
201.

LORD ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (Free

Press ed. 1948).

202. For an analysis of the effectiveness of the common law in this area, compare
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1320, 1347-49
with Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609,
624-29 (1959). The prevailing view in Congress was well stated by Senator Kennedy:
"I do not think state law provides adequate remedies in [the election] field." 105
CONC,. REc. 6487 (1959).
203. SELECT

COMM.

ON

IMPROPER

ACTIVITIES

IN

THE

LABOR

OR

MANAGEMENT

FIELD, INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1958).
204. For a summary of the legislative history see Mamula v. United Steelworkers,
304 F.2d 108, 109-12 (3d Cir. 1962).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1964).
206. While unions are free to establish stricter standards if they wish, states may
not, since "it would be confusing, unduly burdensome, and often impossible for (unions]
to comply with a variety of election laws." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
22 (1959).
207. This "range" has been aptly described as a "series of processes which may
begin with the naming of an election committee and move by successive stages through
nominating procedures, campaign activities, balloting, and finally end with a tabulahttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
tion of the votes." Summers, supra note 197, at 1224.
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A.

Substantive Regulations under Title IV

Written in a rambling narrative style, Title IV's guarantees
can be divided into three basic areas. These deal with election procedures, voters, and candidates. While these categories are not mutually
exclusive, they do provide a convenient foundation upon which to base
an analysis of the title's mechanics.
1.

ProceduralRegulations

With the exception of federations,"'8 all labor organizations must
elect their officers2" 9 at specified time intervals which vary according
to the nature of the organization. 210 Notice of all such elections must be
mailed, at least fifteen days beforehand, to each member in good standing at his last known home address.2"' Furthermore, with one partial
exception, 1 the use of a secret ballot is required in all instances. 1 3
The requirement of a secret ballot, probably the most significant
procedural innovation of the LMRDA, makes mandatory what has
208. Federations of national or international unions, like the AFL-CIO, are
expressly excluded from coverage under Title IV. 29 U.S.C. § 481(a) (1964).
209. "'Officer' means any constitutional officer, any person authorized to perform
the functions of president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, or other executive function of a labor organization, and any member of its executive board or similar
governing body." 29 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1964). Business agents or representatives
generally fall within this definition; shop stewards do not. U.S. DEP'Tr OF LABOR,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AID No. 5, ELECTING UNION OFFICERS (1964). In determining whether or not a position is an office, "decisions . . . will require a practical
judgment. . . . The name or title that the labor organization assigns to the position
will not be controlling." 29 C.F.R. § 452.4(d) (1967). Where the issue is disputed,
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1967), may provide federal jurisdiction for a private civil enforcement suit. Although this position is inconsistent with the narrow spirit of Calhoon
v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964), it is technically valid since it is confined to those
situations where the alleged violation does "not arise out of a pre- or post-election
challenge in the usual sense." McKeon v. Local 107, Teamsters, 223 F. Supp. 341,
344 (D. Del. 1963).
210. National or international unions must elect their officers "not less often than
once every five years"; locals, "every three years"; and intermediate bodies, "every
four years." 29 U.S.C. § 481(a), (b), (d) (1964). Although not a definitive test,
a national or international union may generally be distinguished from a local in that
the latter has no chartered subordinate bodies. An intermediate body, on the other
hand, may be subordinate to a national or international union, but cannot be a local.
"Included within this category is any conference, general committee, joint or system
board, or joint council" with the exception of "State or local central bodies." 29
C.F.R. § 451.4-.5 (1967).
211. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964). Hand delivery will not suffice. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, supra note 209. Some savings may be effected, however, by the mailing of
ballots themselves as election notices, an authorized procedure so long as it is timely
done (15 days prior to the election). Similarly, publication of notice in a union newspaper which is mailed to all members is sufficient provided that the notice is reasonably conspicuous in the context of the paper. Id.
212. An international union may choose its officers by an open vote of convention
delegates; however, the delegates themselves must be chosen by secret ballot. 29
U.S.C. § 481 (a) (1964). The open convention vote was prompted by the congressional
desire to permit union members to determine the extent to which their elected delegates
complied with instructions. A similar indirect procedure is likewise available to intermediate
bodies. University
29 U.S.C.Charles
§ 481(d)
(1964).
Published
by Villanova
Widger
School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
213.
29 U.S.C. § 481(e)
(1964).
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been universally recognized as the "sine qua non of a free election."2'14
Unfortunately, however, as defined in the Act,2 15 it has undergone a
very literal construction inconsistent with its basic purpose. For example, in Wirtz v. Local 11, Hod Carriers,21 ' ballots were numbered
"1" to "1,000", of which some 478 were actually used. As each ballot
was distributed by the judges of election, the financial secretary stamped
the membership dues ledger, with no ballot being issued to any member
in arrears. At the same time a "watcher" for the insurgent candidates
recorded "by name or dues book number ' 217 the identity of each voter
in the same numerical order as the ballots. Although there was thereby
created a two-fold possibility for voter identification, that is by comparing ballot numbers with either the incumbent's dues registrar or
with the insurgent's voter list, the court found that the dues list had
not been so marked as to enable anyone to correlate it with votes cast
and that the possibility of the insurgents obaining such information had
been precluded by their failure to ever obtain custody of the ballots.
In short, "[s]o far as the conduct of the election was concerned the
votes of the members were, in fact, secret." 2 " Significantly, the court
also found that there was no evidence whatsoever "that the members
thought their votes could be detected."2 9
While the court's decision is probably sound on the basis of this
latter finding of fact, the language, insofar as it stresses the importance
of de facto identification, hamstrings the application of the Act. Of
equal importance with the actual preservation of secrecy is the atmosphere of integrity which must surround the electoral process in order
to guarantee full voluntariness. Reasonable fear of identification can
have as devastating an effect on an election as identification itself.
It is submitted, therefore, that wherever a reasonable possibility for
electoral abuse exists in the union election procedure, and this fact
is known by the electorate, a new election should be ordered notwithstanding the fact that the potential abuse never became an actuality.
A rather high hurdle is posed for any individual or group challenging the secrecy of a ballot since, in order to obtain judicial relief, a
214. Beaird, Union Officer Election Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 1306, 1308 (1965).
215. "'Secret ballot' means the expression by ballot, voting machine, or otherwise,
but in no event by proxy, of a choice with respect to any election . . . which is cast
in such a manner that the person expressing such choice cannot be identified with the
choice expressed." 29 U.S.C. § 402(k) (1964).
216. 211 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
217. Id. at 412.
218. Id. at 412-13.
219. Id. at 413. Not one of the twenty-six members who protested the election to
the International Hod Carriers Union "complained that any voter's choice was influenced" by any fear of their identification. Id. This factor was apparently dismissed
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
by Professor Beaird. Beaird, supra note 214, at 1312.
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showing must be made that the alleged violation "may have affected"
the result of the election in question. 2
To adequately demonstrate the requisite effect, a union member
must testify as to how he voted, yet this results in destroying the secrecy
of the ballot - the purpose of the Act. Moreover, such information
could not be elicited from an unwilling witness since it is privileged
matter. 2 ' While the Act's express requirement of "effect" probably
22 2
precludes the possibility of abandoning such disclosure altogether,
it would seem to be a sound solution to place the burden of proof as to
non-violation on the unions themselves since it is they who have
created the problem in the first instance.2 23 Such a procedure, which
has met with approval in dealing with candidate exclusions, 224 would
necessarily act as an inducement towards the establishment of refined
voting techniques 2 while, in the interim, fully protecting the rights
of individual union members.
Although violations of proper procedures seldom occur during
the actual conduct of an election, 2 6 Title IV nevertheless provides for
certain safeguards designed to guarantee the continuance of this situation. Therefore, each candidate is entitled to have an observer at the
counting of the ballots as well as at the polls.2 27 Furthermore, the "votes
cast by members of each local labor organization shall be counted,
and the results published, separately. 2 2 8 In all cases, to insure adequate
investigative records when claims of misconduct are made, unions are
required to preserve the ballots used for a period of one year. 2
220. See pp. 50-52 infra.
221. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 31; MODEL CODE OV EVIDENCe 225 (1942);
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2214(6) (b) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ; see Annot., 90
A.L.R. 1362 (1934).
222. But see Beaird, supra note 214, at 1312.
223. Obviously if there are no feasible means of ascertaining voter identity, any
claims of fear and influence should carry little weight. See Wayfield v. Babcock,
47 CCH Lab. Cas.
18,375 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). As to this issue, the burden of proof
definitely should be on the plaintiff.
224. See pp. 51-52 infra.
225. This inducement is particularly desirable in the administration of absentee
balloting. For, although there is no right as such whereby union members may demand
an absentee vote, the courts will generally require it if otherwise there will be a substantial disfranchisement of the membership. Goldberg v. Marine Cooks Union, 204
F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Cal. 1962). But see Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 52 CCH
Lab. Cas. 1 16,752 (D. Nev. 1965). This requirement, coupled with the Act's prohibition of the use of proxies, has caused mail voting - with all the problems inherent
in such a procedure - to be the most popular alternative means of tabulation. Jenkins,
supra note 199, at 178-79.
226. Summers, supra note 197, at 1223.
227. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1964). While substitute observers may be freely used,
unless the union's constitution or by-laws provide to the contrary, no more than one
may be present at any given time. U.S. Dep't of Labor Release, BLMR-41/USDLNo. 4,438 (March 14, 1961).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964).
229. Likewise, if the election is an open one at a union convention, the delegates'
credentials must be preserved. The duty of preservation, whether it be with regard
Published
by Villanova
University falls
Charles
Widger
of Law
Repository,
1967
to ballots
or credentials,
upon
the School
secretary
of Digital
the union
unless another official
is named. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e)-(f) (1964).
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Under Title IV, therefore, union members are guaranteed full
notice of all elections as well as "fair play" when they are conducted.
While far from radical in its concepts, it is procedurally significant both
in the formal recognition of the importance of the union electoral
process as well as in the codified base which it provides to control potential abuses.
2.

The Right to Nominate and Vote

The statutory guarantee provided by Title IV is quite specific in
its guarantee of these crucial rights.
In any election required by this section [Title IV] which is
to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given
for the nomination of candidates and every member in good standing shall ...have the right to vote for or otherwise support the
. . . candidates of his
choice. . . . Each member . . . shall be
2 30
entitled to one vote.

In defining the requirement of "a reasonable opportunity" to
nominate, the courts have found themselves so deeply enmeshed both
in the Title I-Title IV jurisdictional web, and in defining the right to
vote, that they have frequently given but a cursory analysis to the
highly significant substantive right to nominate. 231 Thus, most of the
interpretative materials currently extant are of administrative derivation. Regardless, it is clear that a labor organization "must give
reasonable notice of the offices to be filled by the election and of the
time, place, and form of submitting nominations. 2 32 Furthermore,
this requirement of notice applies to all steps of the nominating process,
including required declarations of candidacy where permissible. 3 3
While the right to nominate is not absolute, 2 4 it cannot be arbitrarily restricted, for example, by allowing nominations only by mem230. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964).
231. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) ; Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Paravate v. Local 13, Ins. Workers, 51 CCH
Lab. Cas. 19,695 (W.D. Pa. 1965) ; Wayfield v. Babcock, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 18,375
(E.D.N.Y. 1963).
232. 29 C.F.R. § 452.8 (1967). "The Act does not prohibit the use of a single
notice for both nominations and elections. Such joint notice, however, must be given
in sufficient time to permit reasonable opportunity for members to nominate candidates and must also meet the requirements for election notices." U.S. DEP'T oF LABOR,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AID No. 5, ELECTING UNION OFFICERS (1960). This latter
requirement has particular application in determining how notice is to be effected since
nomination notices, unlike election notices which must be mailed, allow for the use of
any reasonable means in accord with the constitution and by-laws of the union.
233. Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(declaration requirement held invalid as being used solely to paralyze opposition).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
234. Wirtz v. Local 560, Teamsters, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,433 (D.N.J. 1965) ;
Jackson v. International Langshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962).
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bers of a board of directors." 5 In the same context, it is obvious that
although the secret ballot requirements of the Act do not apply to the
right of nomination,2 3 its free exercise is expressly protected from
However, the
"penalty, discipline, or improper interference. . . .,2
right to nominate, while potentially broad in scope, has yet to be
precisely defined because it has suffered from a lack of ad hoc contexts
in which it could be. This in no way detracts from the value of the
right but rather emphasizes its flexible potential in future litigation.
The right to vote, or more accurately, its exercise, is the substance
of which elections are made. The bulk of Title IV, as well as much of
Title I, is directed in one way or another towards refining it into a
tool of responsible voluntarism. Granted to "every member in good
standing,"2 8 it, like the right to nominate, is subject to reasonable
union regulation. Although Title IV itself does not authorize such
restrictions and indeed defines the right in absolute terms, the Department of Labor, citing section 101 (a) of Title I which does speak in
terms of "reasonable rules and regulations" regarding voting, has held
the imposition of restrictions to be valid. 23 9 This interpretation is undoubtedly justified, for otherwise, unions would be either stripped of
all control over their own elections or else be forced to develop an
artificial membership structure in order to achieve internal election
processes. In view of the congressional goal of union democracy, neither
presents a particularly satisfactory alternative.
What is "reasonable" is again, with one specific administrative
exception, 240 left to the courts for their ad hoc development. 241 Although
most of the litigation involving this right has thus far taken place
in the context of Title 1,242 there has been one significant case under
Title IV. In Goldberg v. Marine Cooks Union,243 the Secretary of

Labor charged that the defendant union, in violation of the Act, 244 was
creating special classes of non-voting members since it refused to
16,629 (N.D. Ind.
235. Wirtz v. Office Employees Ass'n, 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
1965). But see Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (self-nomination only upheld).
236. Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 198 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1962) ; Opinion
Letter of the Commissioner, BLMR (Jan. 5, 1961).
237. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964).
238. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964). See also note 14 supra.

239. 29 C.F.R. § 452.10(a) (1967).
240. Unions may, "in appropriate circumstances, defer eligibility to vote by requiring a reasonable period of prior membership, such as 6 months or a year, or by
requiring apprentice members to complete their apprenticeship training, as a condition
of voting." 29 C.F.R. § 452.10(a) (1967).
241. Certain specific rules do exist, however, with regard to the administration of
financial prerequisites for voting qualification where the check-off system is employed.
See note 252 infra.
242. See pp. 11-13 supra.
1962).
204 F. Supp.
844 Charles
(S.D. Cal.
Published243.
by Villanova
University
Widger
School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
244. See note 240 supra.
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allow some 1200 non-"full book" members 245 to vote for officers even
though they did have job seniority and were charged "service fees"
for their job referrals. The Secretary contended that under the
union constitution which provided that "[m]embership classification
shall correspond to and depend upon seniority classifications" and
under the Hughes definition of LMRDA "membership," the non-"full
book" employees were "members" and entitled to vote.246 Although
intimating dissatisfaction with the union's "unnecessarily long" probationary period for full membership, the court held that "the peculiar
circumstances under which men ship at sea are such as to warrant
the imposition of conditions which assure stability of employment over
a period of time. ' 247 Eschewing responsibility, it found that "it is not
for this tribunal to impose its concept of a proper period upon the
union, 2' 4 and ruled that the complainants were members neither under

the union constitution nor under the LMRDA.
It is certainly not the duty of a court, in the first instance, to
impose its "concept" of a time limitation on a union franchise. However, where a union's program is designed to create consistently large,
long-term classes of non-voters, as in Goldberg, then by default it
does become the function of the court to protect those thereby excluded.
Linguistic artistry, while valuable to a court in skirting the substance
of difficult issues, provides no stimulus for the growth of union
democracy. Certainly "so long as [unions] in reaching [their] decisions violate no provisions of law . . . judges should resolutely keep
[their] hands off."'2 49 Here, however, the essential violation by the

Marine Union was patent, and the court's action, therefore, an abdication of responsibility.
In short, in view of the importance which Congress has attached
to the encouragement of union democracy and the function of union
elections as a means thereto, it would seem that courts should not
hesitate to actively intervene in instances of relatively obvious disfranchisement.25 ° In this special area, as perhaps in no other, they
245. To become a "full-book" member, it was necessary to swear an "oath of
obligation," pay a 150 dollar initiation fee, and serve a rather lengthy period of
shipping time, generally from five to six years.
246. See p. 4 supra.
247. 204 F. Supp. at 845.

248. Id.
249. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964).
250. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Bookbinders Local 25, 196 F. Supp. 308, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), where the court indicated that it would be unreasonable to correlate voting
rights with job skills. See also Wirtz v. Trico Workers Union, Civil No. 9374
(W.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 25, 1961) (union, because of external pressures, relented in
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
opposing the rights of members on lay-off status to vote) ; Wirtz v. Office Employees
Ass'n, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 16,629 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
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should assume an aggressive posture; it is here, in the long run, that
the success or failure of the LMRDA will be measured.
3.

The Right to Candidacy

The operative section of the Landrum-Griffin Act controlling candidacy provides:
[E]very member in good standing 5 1 shall be eligible to be a
candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title
and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed). .

.

. No

member whose dues [have been collected under a check-off system
administered pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement] shall
be declared ineligible to ...

be a candidate for office ...by reason

of alleged delay or default in the payment of dues.25 2

a. Section 504. - No person who has been convicted of or imprisoned as a result of his conviction of certain specified common law
crimes 258 or any violations of Titles II and III shall serve as a union
officer for five years thereafter 254 under the provisions of section 50425
of Title IV. Although conceived and drafted with undisputed good
purpose, this section has been subjected to severe criticism 25 because
of its administrative dependence upon state criminal law. For example,
any individual convicted of grand larceny is covered by the section's
proscription, yet "grand larceny" itself may vary, insofar as its minimal
required amount is concerned, from five dollars to five hundred
dollars. 257 The potential for jurisdictional inequitude here is obvious
and similar problems exist with regard to almost all of the other crimes
listed. By the same token, certain other offenses, equally reprehensible,
by reason of their non-listing carry no disqualification whatsoever. 25 s
251. "Member in good standing" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (1964); see
pp. 3-4 supra.
252. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (e) (1964). The provision dealing with non-disqualification
of candidates because of tardy transmissions of check-off dues also forbids restricting
the right to vote. Id. Because most litigation concerning this provision has dealt
with the right of candidacy, it is discussed here rather than in connection with the
right to vote. See pp. 35-36 supra.
253. These include: "robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny,
burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill,
assault which inflicts grievious bodily injury ......

29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1964).

254. Certain exceptions are made for persons who have been pardoned or granted
an exemption by the Board of Parole of the Department of Justice. 29 U.S.C.
§ 504(a) (2) (B) (1964).
255
U.S.C.Trade
§ 504 Union
(1964).Elections, in
256.. 29
Jenkins,

REGULATING

UNION

GOVERNMENT

162-63

(Estey, Taft & Wagner ed. 1964).
257. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-100 (1960) (grand larceny when five dollars
is taken) with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1294 (1967) (grand larceny when five hundred
dollars is taken).
The jury-tampering
conviction
of Teamster
president
James 1967
Hoffa presents
Published258.
by Villanova
University Charles
Widger School
of Law Digital
Repository,
an obvious contemporary example. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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Section 504, therefore, despite its abstract appeal, has decided practical

limitations..
b. "Reasonable Regulations Uniformly Imposed." - The question
of whether a particular union's candidacy qualification standards are
reasonable is obviously one which, in the last analysis, must be determined on an ad hoc basis.26 But while no qualification has therefore a
per se acceptability, certain general guidelines may nevertheless be
drawn. Initially it would seem that no regulation whatsoever should
be allowed unless "the needs or necessities of the . . . union" require
it.261 A democracy, by its nature, functions best when unimpeded by

unnecessary and potentially corruptive restrictions on its process of
leadership selection. It would seem that unions have more to lose by
enabling entrenched incumbents to perpetuate themselves than by
creating the slim chance that an unqualified candidate might achieve
office. 2 In determining "necessity," the practices of other unions are
obviously relevant. Common sense dictates the conclusion that a restriction is unnecessary if substantially all other unions are able to work
without it, while logically the converse would also hold true.2 68 In

either instance, however, the effects of a restriction must be evaluated
in the context of the particular union involved, especially in the latter
case if general disqualification results.2 64
More specifically, for example, the abstract right of a union to
demand compliance with its financial levies as a condition precedent to
the exercise of a right of candidacy is clear. 65 But if, for example, a
union required each candidate to have paid his quarterly dues prior to
their due date in every quarter during the year preceding an election,
the regulation, though seemingly innocuous, might well be "unreasonable" if it failed to provide for a "grace" period and had the effect of
arbitrarily excluding the vast majority of the membership from eligi259. That provision of section 504 which proscribed the activities of Communists
in the labor area was struck down by the Supreme Court as constituting an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Brown v. United States, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Because
this question is not integrally related to the instant discussion, and furthermore,
because its application thereto is extremely speculative, it will not be discussed herein.
See Note, 54 CALIF. L. Rev. 212 (1966) ; Note, 79 HARV. L. Rgv. 120 (1966) ; cf. Note,
10 VILL. L. Rgv. 177 (1964).
260. 29 C.F.R. § 452.7(b) (1967).
261. Goldberg v. Amarillo Gen. Drivers Local 577, 214 F. Supp. 74, 80 (W.D.
Tex. 1963).
262. As a practical matter, it certainly would be easier to initiate recall procedures
against a tyro incompetent than a seasoned incumbent. See p. 42 infra.
263. Cf. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 178 n.6 (1964).
But see Beaird, supra note 214, at 1321.
264. 29 C.F.R. § 452.7(b) (1967). See, e.g., Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6,
265 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
265. See, e.g., McDonough v. Johnson, 49 CCH Lab. Cas.
19,042 (N.D.
Ohio 1964).

38

Berchem: Labor Democracy in America: The Impact of Titles I & (and) IV of

FALL

1967]

LABOR

DEMOCRACY

IN

AMERICA

bility.2 66 Similar yet more complex problems are likewise created
when a union utilizes a check-off method of collection. In Wirtz v.
Local 191, Teamsters,"7 where a union disqualified a member as a
candidate because of his late payment of dues even though he thought
in good faith that his dues were paid and, in fact, they would have
been except for irregular employer check-off practices acquiesced in by
the union, the disqualification was found to be in violation of section
401 (e).6 Where, however, dues were not checked off because the
employees had earned no wages from which they could be deducted,
the employees' failure to satisfy their obligations personally was held
to provide a justifiable basis for their disqualification.26 9
Other than dues restrictions, the most commonly imposed prerequisite for candidate eligibility is minimal attendance at union meetings. Thus, where a union required seventy-five per cent attendance at
its regular meetings for a two year period preceding an election, and

allowed excuses only for work conflicts, it was held unreasonable since
it resulted in only two and two-tenths per cent of the membership
being eligible.27 On the other hand, a rule requiring attendance at
one meeting in each of the five quarters preceding the election was held
to be "almost the minimum attendance requirement" and obviously
reasonable.2 '
Deferred eligibility for new or transfer members is also permissible,

although these classifications cannot become permanent. 2 Likewise
it would seem that service in lower offices could be required as a prerequisite to holding an office which required particular administrative
expertise.27 8 And although the scope of section 504274 is currently

somewhat in doubt, it is certain that union rules prohibiting either
Communists 275 or persons convicted of crimes "involving moral turpi-

tude offensive to trade union morality" from running for office are
valid.21 6 Required declarations of candidacy several months in advance
of the actual electoral process have, however, been found to serve "no
266. Wirtz v. Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 51 CCH Lab. Cas.
19,579 (D. Colo.
1965), aff'd, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,489 (10th Cir. 1966).
267. 226 F. Supp. 179 (D. Conn. 1964).
268. Accord, Goldberg v. Amarillo Gen. Drivers Local 577, 214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D.
Tex. 1963).
269. Cunningham v. English, 282 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
270. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 244 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
271. Martin v. Boilermakers Local 636, 49 CCH Lab. Cas.
18,813 (W.D.
Pa. 1963).
272. ELgC'rING UNION OIviczas, supra note 209. For a discussion of the same
principle in relation to the right to vote, see pp. 11-13, 35-36 supra.
273. But see Wirtz v. Office Employees Ass'n, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,629 (N.D.
Ind. 1965).
274. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964).
275. Rosen v. District Council 9, Painters, 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Published
by Villanova
Charles
WidgerLocal
School3,of48
LawCCH
DigitalLab.
Repository,
1967
276.
Coburn University
v. Operating
Eng'rs
Cas. 1
18,520 (N.D.
Cal. 1963).
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reasonable purpose" and to constitute merely an instrument to paralyze
opposition forces.""
In summary, the purpose of any judicial evaluation of union candidacy restrictions is to determine whether there is a relevant union
basis for the requirement, 278 and if so, to ascertain the substantive effect
which it has upon the membership as a whole. In this regard it can
be safely said that any such requirement, regardless of its relevance,
which results in substantial numerical ineligibility will, perforce, come
under extremely close scrutiny.
4.

Candidate Rights

By becoming a "candidate" in any Title IV election, a member in
good standing acquires certain rights designed to effectuate the operation of his campaign. Initially he can require the union to comply with
all of his "reasonable requests . . . to distribute [campaign literature]

by mail or otherwise" at his expense. 9 What is reasonable will, of
course, depend upon "not only the time, place, and nature of the request
but also to whom it is made and the ability of that person to comply
with the request.

'2 0

For although a literal reading of section 401 (c)

would seem to indicate that a request to "any officer" would suffice,
a request to the officer under whose auspices the distribution will be
made is obviously preferable. Much confusion can be, and to a certain
extent has been, obviated by the active establishment of detailed codes
of electoral procedure by the unions themselves. In such cases, "unless
these requirements are found clearly to be arbitrary, as where the
request must be made twenty-four hours after nomination, failure of
a candidate to comply [will] ordinarily excuse refusal of the union to
honor the request."'2 ' In any event, the candidate will be able to obtain
a direct and immediate review of any such denial by private suit in
a federal district court.28 2
277. Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Likewise a requirement that a member prove his eligibility for an officer's bond of
the type proscribed by section 502 of the LMRDA has been held unreasonable. Wirtz
v. Local 599, Carpenters, 61 L.R.R.M. 2618 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
278. Only in reference to a declaration of candidacy have the courts found a lack
of such purpose as an abstract proposition. See, e.g., Coburn v. Operating Eng'rs
Local 3, 48 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 18,520 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
279. Section 481 (c) expressly guarantees this right to candidates for office in
"every national or international labor organization . . . and every local labor organization ..
" It excludes federations from coverage and makes no mention of "intermediate bodies." Whether the latter omission is the result of positive design or imprecise draftsmanship is uncertain, although the latter is more contextually probable.
29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1964).

280. Jenkins, supra note 256, at 168.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
281. Id.
282. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1964).
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Although one of the basic purposes of section 401 (c) is to curtail
the use of union funds in almost all aspects of the electoral process,
there is no express requirement that the union charge a fee for its
work. What is expressly required, however, is strict equality of treatment as to expense among all candidates. Thus if "distribution of campaign literature for one candidate is made without charge, then distribution for all candidates must be made without charge."2 3 Union funds
also "may be utilized for notices, factual statements of issues not involving candidates, and other expenses necessary for the holding of an
election." 2 ' While theoretical interpretative problems are rampant in
determining what constitute "factual statements" or "expenses necessary for the holding of an election, ' 2 5 in actual practice there has been
no significant litigation in the area, probably as the result of a sound
common-sense approach to the problem by most union leaders.
The same basic principles of fair play also apply to the use of
membership lists. For even though there is only a limited basic guarantee in this regard - candidates in unions subject to a collective bargaining agreement requiring membership therein as a condition of employment have the right, once, within thirty days prior to the election,
to inspect, but not to copy, 2 6 the names and addresses of the members - if the union does allow more frequent inspection or allows any
candidate to copy, it must do so for all. It is uncertain, however,
whether private suits are available to enforce this right. 2 1 Aside from
these specific areas it is left to the unions themselves to establish "adequate safeguards to insure a fair election, ' 28 8 a delegation of responsibility consistent with the legislative objective of "union democracy"
and sufficiently flexible to meet the diverse demands of modern unionism.
283. U.S. D8P'T Ot LABOR, TECHNICAL AsSISTANcE AID No. 5, ELECTING UNION
OPPICERs 22 (1964). Section 481(g) states: "No moneys received by any labor
organization by way of dues, assessment, or similar levy . .. shall be contributed or
applied to promote the candidacy of any person" in a Title IV election. 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(g) (1964). Although this would seem to impliedly forbid the granting of any
free distributions regardless of equality between candidates, it has been generally
assumed that "free distributions" are not per se invalid.
284. 29 U.S.C. § 48 1(g)
forbidden in all instances.

(1964).

The use of employers' funds for any purpose is

285. See Daniels, Union Elections and the Landrunm-Griflin Act, 13 N.Y.U.
CONFtRZNC9 ON LABOR 317, 318-24 (1960).
286. Fears of potential misuse of these lists by either company spies or unscrupulous members caused the restriction of the right of candidates with regard to membership lists to include inspection only. While in retrospect probably unrealistic, they
were very real at the time of the passage of the LMRDA. Thus Senator Kennedy
emphatically stated that the right of "inspection is not to enable him [a candidate]
to have a copy." 105 CONG. REc. 17900 (1959).
287. Daniels, supra note 285, at 325.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
288. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1964).
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Removal of Officers

Although directed primarily towards guaranteeing to union members the right of recall, section 401(h)2 89 necessarily provides union
officers with procedural rights analogous to those given members themselves in section 101(a) (5).29
Dealing expressly with the problem
of the "removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct," it establishes
a procedure whereby the adequacy of union removal provisions may
be reviewed by the Secretary of Labor,29 ' who, if he finds deficiencies
therein, may order the use of a system under which officers "may be
removed, for cause shown and after notice and hearing, by the members in good standing voting in a secret ballot conducted by the [other]
officers ...."292
To enable unions to correlate their procedures, as contained in
their constitutions and by-laws, with the basic mandate of section
401 (h), the Secretary of Labor has been further directed to "promulgate
rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards . . .for determining the adequacy" of particular removal schemes.298 Although the
Secretary, under this mandate, has done little but restate the general
prerequisites of jurisprudential fairness, 294 his regulations have served
to underscore the need, in all instances of official discipline, for adequate
notice, a full and fair hearing, and an authorized trial board. 29 5 The
sole noteworthy innovative aspect of either the statute or the regulations in this regard lies in their decided emphasis upon the use of the
entire membership body, polled by secret ballot, as a determinative
tribunal. While seemingly valuable insofar as it removes the possibilities of clique engineered whitewashes, the full feasibility of this trial
by referendum practice has yet to be empirically established.
B.

Enforcement

For the purposes of enforcement, Title IV distinguishes between
violations which occur prior to an election and those which occur
289. 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1964).

290. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1964).
291. This may be done only "upon application of any member of a local labor
organization" in a hearing held "in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act." 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1964). The aggrieved "member" may, of course, be either
a rank and file worker who feels there has been a "whitewash" or an officer who
feels that he has been illegally purged.
292. 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1964).

293. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (i) (1964).
294. 29 C.F.R. § 417.2 (1967).

295. Id. Any suits brought to secure rights granted to union officers by section
401(h) must be brought by the Secretary of Labor, there being no authorization for
private enforcement suits. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964). See also Mamula v. Local 1211,
United Steelworkers, 205 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Pa. 1962), vacating in part, 202 F.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
Supp. 348 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Verbiscus v. Marine Workers Local 49, 238 F. Supp.
848 (E.D. Mich. 1964). For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 45-46 infra.
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afterward. Pre-election violations are to be remedied by private suits in
state courts, 296 and post-election violations by an exclusive federal
procedure with the Secretary of Labor as the complaining party.
1.

Pre-Election Relief

Title III of Senate Bill 505,297 the original antecedent of what is
now Title IV, established an exclusive and pre-emptive federal postelection remedy for all violations of its substantive provisions, thereby
totally precluding the availability of either state or federal pre-elective
relief. 9 ' It was felt that to allow private pre-elective federal suits would
result in overburdening the federal judiciary,2 9 while an authorization
of pre-elective state court enforcement either by their own substantive
laws or by Title IV would be inconsistent with the basic congressional
goal of a uniform national labor policy.8 0 Subsequently, however, in
recognition of the value of pre-elective suits as a means of obviating
unnecessarily protracted litigation,"0 ' this policy of federal preclusion
was modified to preserve "existing (pre-elective) rights and remedies
30 2
to enforce the constitution and by-laws of a labor organization.
By simply preserving pre-election "rights and remedies" as they
existed prior to Title IV, Congress thus limited the availability of preelective relief to state courts 0 ' and avoided the clogging of the federal
296. See pp. 43-44 & notes 303-05 infra.
297. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
298. The proposed bill provided: "The duties imposed and the rights and remedies
provided by this title shall be exclusive .. " S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1959).
299. See, e.g., remarks of Senator Carroll, in 105 CONG. Rvc. 6486 (1959).
300. See S. Rrp. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1959).
301. The American Civil Liberties Union was extremely active in urging this
change. See, e.g., A LABOR UNION "BILL O RIGHTS" - DiwocRAcy IN LABOR
UNION - THP KENNXDY-Ivts BILL (1958).
302. S. 1555, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 303 (1959). This section later became section
403 of Title IV, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1964).
303. In view of the exclusive federal jurisdictional approach originally adopted
by S. 505, section 403 must be narrowly construed.
Suspension of the pre-emptive effect of § 403 and its antecedents is one thing,
enlargement of federal jurisdiction quite another. Resort to State courts prior
to the election was specifically approved, but nowhere in the subsequent developments of the legislation can a change of Congressional intent, enlarging federal
jurisdiction to include pre-election affairs, be found.
Colpo v. Local 107, Teamsters, 201 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D. Del. 1961), vacated as moot,
305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); see Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964) ; McArthy v. District Lodge No. 9, Machinists, 252 F.
Supp. 350, 352-54 (E.D. Mo. 1966) ; Note, Election Remedies Under the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1617, 1626, 1629 (1965).
But see Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 146 (concurring opinion) ; Summers, Preemption and the Labor Reform Act - Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J.
119, 138 n.89 (1961) ; Note, Union Elections Under the LMRDA, 74 YALt L.J. 1282,
1290-95 (1965). This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that in section
401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964), Congress specifically provided for federal preelection
relief, thereby
impliedly
excluding
such
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles Widger
School
of Law
Digital Repository,
1967 cases. See
jurisdiction
in all other
Calhoon v. Harvey, supra.
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courts with the possible exception of diversity cases."0 4 Furthermore,
by restricting state jurisdiction to the enforcement of union constitutions
and by-laws, it precluded misinterpretation of Title IV's guarantees by
non-labor oriented state courts 305 and rendered their scope of activity
so narrow as to make the chances of inconsistent relief de minimis.
Restricting jurisdiction to the enforcement of union constitutions according to state law80 6 and without regard to Title IV avoids the development of "a crazy quilt of state legislation and court decisions, '"807
since "such proceedings . . . do no more than compel the union officers
to comply with the rules voluntarily adopted by the members. ' '8° It is

not the function of the state courts, therefore, to determine whether or
not union constitutional provisions are consistent with Title IV since
these questions can best be handled by the federal courts in postelection proceedings. 0 9 Although in some instances this may cause
state courts to be ineffectual, for example, where there are no relevant
constitutional provisions upon which to base relief, or more significantly,
where a provision clearly violates the LMRDA, these occasions are
certain to be rare and are always subject to eventual federal correction.
Even in this latter instance, however, where a particular provision
is subject to a general union standard of reasonableness, "the language
of section 403 does not seem to prevent the state court from using the
304. In what is perhaps the best legislative analysis of the role of section 403,
Senator Kennedy stated:
In the case of elections we preempt action for the Federal Government after
the election is held. A suit may be filed in a State court prior to an election.
The Federal Government takes preemption after an election. We have attempted
to exercise Federal rights in those areas where the Federal Government can best
do the job, and have attempted to provide for State preemption in the areas
where the State can do it best. . . . Prior to the day of an election an individual
can sue in a State. The day after an election the Secretary of Labor assumes
jurisdiction.
105 CONG. REc. 6485 (1959) (emphasis added).
305. It would be singularly anomalous to allow state courts to have full jurisdictional powers to interpret and enforce Title IV when the federal courts themselves,
the "primary forum for the vindication of federal rights," would be precluded from
doing so. H. M. HART & H. W8CIzsSL4R, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTZM 727 (1953). See notes 303 & 304 supra. Thus in Burroughs v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 3, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,454 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1966), the court held that
while there was some question whether state courts could enforce Title I actions,
"a state court has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction or render a decision in
cases alleging primarily and substantially a violation of Title IV rights." Id. Accord,
Beiso v. Robilotto, 26 Misc. 2d 137, 212 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
306. See Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 343 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1965).
307. S. RP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1959).
308. Statement of Professor Cox, in Hearings on S. 505 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1959).
309. While this interpretation may cause theoretical problems insofar as union
constitutions will be interpreted according to state law prior to an election and pursuant to federal law thereafter, such an approach, has, however, support in the legislative history of the Act. See note 304 supra. Also, it would seem to present no
significant chance for inconsistent interpretations in view of the simplified nature of
this concurrent substantive jurisdiction. See Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 343 F.2d 460 (2d
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
Cir. 1965).
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provisions of Title IV and the cases decided under that title as a basis
for determining" compliance with that standard."' 0 In this manner, the
dangers of misapplication can be even further reduced.
Thus, once it was determined that the public interest would not be
served by authorizing full-scale private suits in federal courts, Congress
preserved the existing jurisdictional bases upon which state courts
could grant pre-elective relief but limited the latter's substantive ability
to do so to prevent a conflict with uniform national labor policy.
However, since most union constitutions are fairly detailed in this
area,8 1' and since they in turn must conform to the basic provisions of
Title IV,"1 2 most consequential violations will be able to be speedily

remedied. Thus pre-elective relief will be available when, by the very
nature of the remedy, it is most appropriate, that is, where the law is
relatively certain and only the facts are in dispute. In so doing, Congress
thereby avoided the dangers inherent in the use of pre-elective suits
when they are utilized to obtain hasty judgments on complex interpretive issues, issues which will be much better decided under the restrained
and considered procedure of post-election suits under the direction of
the Secretary of Labor.
2.

Post-ElectionRelief

In contrast to the interpretive donnybrook which has characterized
the pre-elective area, there is no question but that once an election has
been "conducted" the exclusive remedy for any alleged violations in
its conduct is by complaint to the Secretary of Labor.813 In analyzing
the proper scope of Title IV, therefore, it is obviously necessary to determine precisely when an election has, in fact, been "conducted." Three
reasonable alternatives suggest themselves - when the voting begins,
when it ends, or when the votes are tabulated and the results announced.
The emasculative effect which the first of these hypotheses would have
on the scope of Title 1314 as well as on pre-elective relief under Title IV
is obvious ;315 the same is true of the second, which, although providing
310. Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 78 HARV. L. Rev. 1617, 1629 (1965).
311.

See, e.g., U.S. De'T Olt LABOR, UNION CONSTITUTIONS AND TH

ELECTION

o0 LOCAL UNION OFVICtRS (1965); U.S. DP'T ov LABOR, BULL. No. 1239, UNION
CONSTrTUTION PROVISIONS (1958); cf. L. BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS (1959).
312. "The election shall be conducted in accordance with the constitution and
bylaws of such organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964).
313. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
314. See pp. 7-11 supra.
315. Under this approach, any offenses committed at the polling stations themselves, no matter how egregious, would be insulated from all immediate corrective
action. Unfortunately, however, it has been adopted by the one court which has consideredbythe
problem.
Jennings
v. Carey,
51 CCH
Lab.Digital
Cas. Repository,
Published
Villanova
University
Charles
Widger School
of Law
1967
19,423 (D.D.C.
1964) ;
see Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
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for a more prolonged period of direct suit availability, creates a "dash
to the courtroom" procedure which would hardly prove beneficial to
either the parties or the court.'
Under the third alternative, however, a wide range of pre-elective
suits would be guaranteed. While this, of course, raises the danger of
its potential abuse by nuisance litigation, the problem is more apparent
than real. For, although this approach extends the jurisdictional availability for pre-elective relief, it does not increase its substantive content.
In view of the limited scope of post-Calhoon Title I as well as the narrow scope of state court pre-elective relief under Title IV, the courts
should be able to quickly dispose of meritless cases.
Under section 402,317 any union member who has either exhausted
all available union remedies or failed to obtain a final decision within
three months of invoking them, may, within one month thereafter, file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging a violation of section
401. The Secretary must then investigate the complaint, and if he
finds probable cause to believe that a violation has taken place, may
bring suit against the offending unions within sixty days from the date
of the original complaint.
a. Exhaustion of Remedies. - Unlike either the Title 18 or the
common law 19 doctrines of exhaustion, the Title IV exhaustion requirements have been consistently construed s" to prohibit discretionary
exceptions 2' in their application. For, although the statutory language
itself does not necessarily require such a mandatory approach,3 22 the
Act, 78 HARV. L. Rnv. 1617, 1628 (1965).

Noting the potential gap which could have

been created by a literal reading of section 403's two limiting terms, "prior to the
conduct" and "already conducted," the court refused to rule that an election "in
progress" was not "conducted," finding a congressional intent to avoid external inter-

ference at such a time. 51 CCH Lab. Cas. fT19,423, at 32,898. In view of the complete lack of congressional material on the issue, the decision is unjustified in addition
to being unsound.
316. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 146 n.7 (1964) (concurring opinion).
317. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
318. See pp. 17-26 supra.
319. See p. 18 supra.

320. Wirtz v. Local 125, Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964)
accord, Wirtz v. Great Lakes Dist. Local 47, Masters, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 16,803
(N.D. Ohio 1965) ; Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,752
(D. Nev. 1965).
321. Where the internal complaint is to be heard by the very people against whom
it is being made, there may be some basis for dispensing with exhaustion. See Wirtz
v. Local 125, Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590, 595 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
322. A member of a labor organization1) who has exhausted the remedies available . . .

2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision . . .
may file a complaint....
29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1964) (emphasis added). These two alternatives are exclusive.
If the union member does not file within one month after his three months have
expired, he must then wait until he has obtained a final decision. See Jenkins, Trade

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
Union Elections, in RG1ULATING UNION
ed. 1964).

GOVERNMENT

182 (Estey, Taft & Wagner
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legislative history clearly indicates that a member "must show that he
has pursued any remedies available to him within the union . . .in a

timely manner."3 23 He need not, however, have exercised the preelective rights available to him. 24
Although this interpretation of section 402 is certainly most
consistent with its legislative history, the rigidity of such an approach
on the part of Congress is somewhat anomalous in the context of the
entire LMRDA. There is little reason to differentiate between Titles I
and IV in this regard. In fact, it would seem that if a rigid approach
were to be used at all, it should be in conjunction with Title I which
does not have the administrative safeguards32 of Title IV to prevent
overly litigious members from rushing into court.
b. The Investigatory Process. - Assuming that exhaustion has
been accomplished, there are no formal requirements for the filing of
a complaint except timeliness. All that a member need do is send a
letter to the Secretary of Labor32 alleging "that any of the election
procedures of Title IV has been violated." ' 7 After an initial sorting
process to eliminate frivolous and untimely claims, 2 " those with prima
facie merit are then subjected to an intensive investigation, pursuant
to the authority granted the Secretary by section 601,29 to determine
323. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959) (emphasis added). The
rationale for the requirement is, of course, that it "preserves a maximum amount of

independence and self-government by giving every international union the opportunity
to correct improper local elections." Id. see also Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving

Union Democracy, 72

HARV.

L. Rev. 609, 633 (1959).

324. Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. q 19,757 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). Likewise, an exercise of pre-election remedies does not excuse the need for
seeking available post-elective relief. Wirtz v. Great Lakes Dist. Local 47, Masters,
52 CCH Lab. Cas.
16,803 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
325. The informal nature of the administrative process allows for frequent voluntary corrective action by unions once they have been apprised of their deficiencies.
In this manner, union coffers are not depleted by unnecessary legal fees and the selfcorrective goals of the LMRDA are promoted. See, e.g., W. WIRTz, LABOR AND Tug
PUBLIC INTER4ST 86 (1964), which indicates that of the 249 actionable Title IV complaints filed between September, 1959 and April, 1964, 193 were settled voluntarily.
326. Actually the administration of section 402 is conducted by the Department
of Labor's Office of Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports (LMWP).
This department, in addition to its main office in Washington, has twenty-four area
and five regional offices where complaints may be filed.
327. ELECTING UNION OFFICERS, supra note 283, at 38.
328. There is no formal appeal procedure at this level.
329. 29 U.S.C. § 521 (1964). The filing of a complaint is not necessary in order to
authorize investigative action nor is the Secretary required to have probable cause
to believe that a violation has occurred. See Local 57, Operating Eng'rs v. Wirtz,
346 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1965) ; Goldberg v. Local 299, Teamsters, 293 F.2d 807 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961); Wirtz v. Edmonds, 51 CCH Lab. Cas.
19,573 (D. Colo. 1965) ; Wirtz v. Local 191, Teamsters, 218 F. Supp. 885 (D.
Conn.), aff'd, 321 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963). He must merely "believe it necessary"
to determine whether or not there has been a violation. Without a complaint, however, no action can be brought against the offending union. Wirtz v. Local 125, Hod
Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964). In conducting his investigation, the
Secretary may "enter such places and inspect such records and accounts and question
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles
Widger School
of Lawhim
Digital
such persons
as he
may deem
necessary
to enable
to Repository,
determine"1967
the relevant
facts. 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (1964). Furthermore, he may delegate his powers to the
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whether there is "probable cause to believe that a violation . . . has
occurred. . . .,s
If the Secretary does find such probable cause and

finds further that the violation has not been remedied, "he is directed
to bring, within 60 days3 3 ' after the complaint has been filed, a civil

3'3 2
action against the labor organization in a Federal district court.
He cannot, however, "institute court proceedings upon the basis of
a complaint alleging such violations unless he also finds probable
cause to believe that they 'may have affected the outcome of an election.' ,,133 The Secretary's decisions as to probable violation and
probable effect are, in turn, subject to judicial review at the instance
of the complainant, 3 4 but cannot be challenged by the offending
union. 3 3

3.

Judicial Enforcement

a. Scope of the Right to Sue. - The expansive scope of the
Secretary's powers of investigation 3 has given rise to yet another
problem in the administration of Title IV, that of determining the
extent to which the Secretary's right to sue is limited by the scope
Department of Justice as well as any of his subordinate officers, Wirtz v. Local 502,
Hod Carriers, 217 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1962) ; Goldberg v. Battles, 196 F. Supp. 749

(E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 299 F.2d 937 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817
(1962) ; exercise full subpoena powers, Local 57, Operating Eng'rs v. Wirtz, 326
F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1964) ; Goldberg v. Battles, 196 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
subject to a duty not to act "oppresively," Goldberg v. Local 299, Teamsters, 293
F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1962) ; Wirtz v. Local 875,
Teamsters, 216 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; and grant immunity to persons whom
he requires to testify and who claim privilege, Ahlers v. United States, 336 F.2d 191
(2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
330. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1964).
331. The sixty day requirement is not absolute. Thus, where the Secretary did
not file suit until sixty-two days after receiving the original complaint, but the
sixieth day was a Sunday and the following Monday a federal holiday, dismissal was
not required. Wirtz v. Local 611, Hod Carriers, 229 F. Supp. 230 (D. Conn. 1964).
Likewise, time spent by the Secretary in seeking enforcement of a subpoena against
a defendant union is not to be included in computing the sixty days. Wirtz v. Local 47,
Masters, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 19,651 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ; see Wirtz v. Local Union
169, Hod Carriers, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,752 (D. Nev. 1965).
332. 29 C.F.R. § 452.16(a) (1967).
333. 29 C.F.R. § 452.16(b) (1967) ; see pp. 50-52 infra. See also Schonfeld
v. Wirtz, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
334. Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Contra,
Katrinic v. Wirtz, 53 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 11,289 (D.D.C. 1966); Altman v. Wirtz,
50 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 19,211 (D.D.C. 1964). Where, although he finds requisite
probable cause, the Secretary decides to stipulate a compromise settlement, the private
complainant, if dissatisfied, may not then intervene. Stein v. Wirtz, 54 CCH Lab.
Cas. 1 11,450 (10th Cir. 1966). Whether he might seek review of the Secretary's
action is uncertain, although the possibility is unlikely.
335. See Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 633 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 366 F.2d 438 (2d dr. 1966).

The

rationale behind this refusal is that the Secretary's action "like indictment by a
Grand Jury . . . establishes nothing as to the merits of the action," and therefore
any challenge would be pointless. Id.; accord, Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,680 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
Eng'rs, supra.
336. See p. 46 supra.
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of the allegations in the union member's original administrative complaint. Without such a complaint there is, of course, no right to sue. 3 7
The problem arises when the Secretary, in investigating to determine
whether "probable cause" exists, discovers additional violations not
included in the complaint. To deny him the right to sue on the basis
of these additional violations would necessarily often result in ineffectual corrective action; on the other hand, to grant him carte blanche
authority to challenge all violations which come to his attention in this
manner would emasculate the private complaint requirement."s
In Wirtz v. Local 125, Hod Carriers,33 9 the Secretary sought to
challenge violations in the defendant union's general election which
he discovered while investigating a complaint concerning a subsequent
runoff. The court dismissed the election charges stating that, "We do
not think that the Secretary under the guise of 'public interest' may
be permitted to complain when the membership has not..
Subsequent cases, however, while espousing the general theory of
Local 125, have, nevertheless, taken a more "common-sense" approach.
Thus in Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers,4" even though only one
member had objected, the court upheld a complaint alleging multiple
deprivations of the right to vote and construed the Act to mean that
"the Secretary has . . . the right . . .to base a complaint to the Court

on every issue which the defendant union had a fair opportunity to
consider and resolve in connection with any member's appeal ....
Using the same reasoning, it further allowed the Secretary to challenge
the union's conduct in distributing campaign lists since an internal
objection had been filed - although none had been made to the Secretary. "Such an approach ... preserve[s] the union's first right to correct its own procedures and . . .help[s] to avoid the intolerable situa-

tion which [would] result if the union [is] permitted to treat the
337. See p. 46 supra. See also 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
338. At least one commentator would allow the LMRDA's general attitude of
rooting out abuses whenever they are found to substantially eliminate the complaint
prerequisites. See Beaird, Union Officer Election Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 1306, 1326-27 (1965).
But see St. Antoine, Landrum-Griffin, 1965-1966: A Calculus of Democratic Values,
19 N.Y.U. CONPERENCX ON LABOR 35, 50-51 (1966).
339. 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Subsequent to this decision, a general
election was conducted. In holding that this second election mooted the questions
raised concerning the first, the Sixth Circuit refused to allow the district court's
decision, which had thereby become unappealable, to stand as precedent. Without

commenting on the merits of the decision, it therefore vacated it. Wirtz v. Local 125,
Hod Carriers, 55 CCH Lab. Cas.
11,781 (6th Cir. 1966).
340. 231 F. Supp. at 595. Were it not for the fairly reasoned legal analysis that
precedes it, the court's statement that "[i]f the members are satisfied, then the
government ought to be satisfied," would be almost ludicrously naive.
341. 52 CCH Lab. Cas. f"16,752 (D. Nev. 1965).
342. Id. (emphasis added). Under this approach, the exhaustion of remedies principle is at least indirectly observed in that the union will have some reasonable prior
Published
Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
notice ofbyall
violations which the Secretary intends to challenge.
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separate complaint of each appealing member as an isolated "case"
filed for vindication of the personal rights of the member without regard
for the public interest. ..

.

While entrenched abuses could undoubtedly be rooted out more
quickly if the Secretary were given almost absolute powers to sue, 44
Congress determined that the "first right" of a union to self-correction
was of such consequence that it felt compelled to expressly require
both an exhaustion of remedies and a private complaint as prerequisites
to the filing of a Title IV suit.

45

Within the context of this determina-

tion, section 402 should receive a "practical interpretation." It should
not be construed, however, so as to eliminate the substance of these
requirements from the Act. The adoption of an unlimited approach
allowing the Secretary to raise any matter he desires subsequent to
a complaint, would serve only to transform both into pro forma gestures.

Such whimsy has never been a congressional characteristic,

46

and criticisms of congressional policy, no matter how substantively
justified, 41 7 do not in turn justify semantic quibbling as a means of
obviating unusually clear congressional intent.
b. "May have Affected." - Although few cases have arisen, perhaps the most substantively troublesome hurdle for the Secretary in
his prosecution of Title IV suits is the requirement that he prove that
the violations of which he complains "may have affected" the outcome
of the challenged election. 48 Without such a demonstration, no relief
can be granted, notwithstanding the existence of even multiple violations.149 As originally drafted, 50 section 402 required the Secretary
to prove actual "effect." However, recognition of the severity of such
a standard3 5' resulted in a modification of the requisite to a demand
343. Id. at 23,853; accord, Wirtz v. Local 450A, Operating Eng'rs, 54 CCH Lab.
Cas. IT11,451 (S.D. Tex. 1966) ; Wirtz v. Local 705, Hotel Employees, 54 CCH Lab.
Cas. ff 11,442 (E.D. Mich. 1966) ; Wirtz v. Local 1377, Elec. Workers, 54 CCH Lab.
Cas. I" 11,391 (N.D. Ohio 1966); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 53 CCH Lab.
Cas. IT11,359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
344. See note 338 supra.
345. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)-(b) (1964).
346. But see Beaird, supra note 338, at 1330.
347. In retrospect, in view of the extremely high percentage of voluntary union
compliances, there would seem to be little compelling need for an expansive right to sue.

See note 325 supra.
348. Initially, of course, the Secretary must have determined to his own satisfaction that there exists "probable cause to believe" that the election has been affected.
29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1964).
349. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1964).
350. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1959). See also H.R. 8342, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 402 (1959).
351.

The Kennedy-Ervin bill (S. 505), as introduced, authorized the court to declare an election void only if the violation of section 401 actually affected the
outcome of the election rather than may have affected such outcome. The
difficulty of proving such an actuality would be so great as to render the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
professed remedy practically worthless. Minority members in committee
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that he prove that the violation "did or reasonably could have been
expected to affect the result of an election.

352

Unfortunately this obviously liberal attitude on the part of Congress has been, until recently, somewhat circumscribed by narrow
judicial interpretation. For, although the issue is frequently of subordinate importance and hence subject to cursory treatment, 3 where
it has been contested the courts have demanded a greater degree of
proof than the statute would seem to require. This has been particularly
true in candidate disqualification cases where the courts have required
the Secretary to prove that the excluded candidates, if they had been
3 54
allowed to run, would have had a reasonable chance of winning.
Such an approach overlooks the publicity values which accrue to
minority candidates even though their chances of election are remote.3 55
Under this standard, "until ...a faction approaches majority status,
3' 5
judicial relief in the federal courts will be absent. 3

In recently rejecting the imposition of so "stringent a burden on
the Secretary," the Second Circuit, in Wirtz v. Local 410, Operating
Eng'rs,85 7 found that the exclusion of willing candidates from the bal-

lots precluded the availability of tangible evidence of the effect of the
exclusion on the election and held that any proof relating to effect
on outcome must necessarily be speculative.35 It therefore, in effect,
established a presumption that "exclusion affects." The court refused,
however, to establish a per se rule. Noting that evidence of the excluded candidates' performance in previous years was relatively inconclusive, it also found that the "excluded candidates were politically
active union members one of whom had stood for and even won office
in earlier years [and that] only a small minority of the union electorate
actually voted."3 9 The court, therefore, apparently would have refused
to grant relief if, for example, the excluded candidates had been totally
secured an amendment correcting this glaring defect and the amendment
is contained in the conference report.
Remarks of Senator Goldwater, in 105 CONG. Rtc. 19765 (1959).
352. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1959).
353. More often than not, court decisions fail to discuss the issue at all. See Note,
Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
78 HARV. L. Rev. 1617, 1632 n.87 (1965).
354. See Wirtz v. Local 410, Operating Eng'rs, 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,154
(N.D.N.Y. 1965); Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
355. See St. Antoine, supra note 338, at 50; Summers, Judicial Regulation of
Union Elections, 70 YALt L.J. 1221, 1257 (1961).
356. Calhoon v. Harvey, 374 U.S. 134, 146 n.7 (1965) (dictum) (concurring
opinion of Jutsice Stewart).
357. 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966). In this consolidated appeal, the circuit court
actually vacated the judgments of the district courts with instructions that the complaints be dismissed as moot.
358. by
Id.Villanova
at 443. University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
Published
359. Id.
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unsuccessful previously and, in the contested election, there had been
nearly full participation by the voting membership.3 6 °
Such an approach is well designed to correct a potentially dangerous gap in Title IV's enforcement process. When the violation is
certain but the "effect" not easily susceptible of proof, it certainly is
practical as well as just to place the burden upon the offending party.
In view of the restricted nature of post-Calhoon Title I rights, it is
especially imperative that Title IV be administered in a manner consonant with the goal of internal union democracy.
4.

Judicial Relief
a. PreliminaryInjunctions -

The Problem of Mootness. -

Due

to the extensive time involved in obtaining a final decision in a Title
IV suit,36' there has been an increasing number of cases in which the
Secretary's complaint has become moot because a subsequent election
was held during the pendency of the original proceedings. 362 Since the
procedural prerequisites of Title IV limit the availability of supplemental complaints challenging the second election, 6 3 there has been
created a potential merry-go-round of uncorrected abuses whereby one
suit becomes moot while the other is not as yet "ripe."
In an attempt to terminate this situation two circuit courts, in addition to urging the streamlining of dockets,3" 4 have recently authorized
the use of temporary injunctions by district courts to enjoin the holding
of all subsequent elections pending a final determination of the Secretary's initial suit. 65 Thus "where it is apparent that the Secretary is
likely to succeed in his claim that the election under which the union's
officers are currently serving was conducted in violation of the requirements of the" ' 6 LMRDA, where the second election is being held
under substantially the same conditions as the first, "where it also
360. See Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 55 CCH Lab. Cas.
11,801, at
18,514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But cf. Wirtz v. Local 406, Operating Eng'rs, 53 CCH
Lab. Cas. 11,297, at 16,991 (E.D. La. 1966).
361. Although the average wait is fifteen months, longer times are not uncommon,
especially where appellate review is exercised. Jenkins, supra note 322, at 188.
362. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 54 CCH Lab. Cas.
11,613 (3d Cir. 1966) ; Wirtz v. Local 410, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1966) ; Wirtz v. Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1966).
363. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 54 CCH Lab. Gas. 1 11,613 (3d
Cir. 1966). But see Goldberg v. Trico Workers Union, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 18,404
(W.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. Wirtz v. Local 18, Operating Eng'rs, 54 CCH Lab. Cas.
1 11,436 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (filing of second action by Secretary moots first).
364. Wirtz v. Local 410, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966). The
Second Circuit expressly recommended that such cases "be assigned at an early stage
to one judge for all purposes" in order to expedite trial. Id. at 444. See also Wirtz
v. Local 125, Laborers' International, 55 CCH Las. Cas. 1 11,781 (6th Cir. 1966);
Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,613 (3d Cir. 1966).
365. See cases cited note 364 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
366. Wirtz v. Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 435, 436 (2d Cir. 1966).
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appears that such injunction will not cause serious injury to the
unions concerned, and where the Secretary is likely to suffer a very
real detriment in his attempt to enforce the law if such restraining
order is not granted," '6 7 then an injunction should issue."' 8
Section 402(b) itself does not authorize the exercise of such
equitable powers. While it does allow a court "to take such action as
it deems proper to preserve the assets of a labor organization," ' it is
otherwise silent370 with respect to the nature of its pre-trial remedies.
However, this omission is not determinative of the question of the
existence of such remedies. On the contrary, when Congress entrusts
to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a
regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the
historic power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes. 37 ' Certainly this should be the case where the court
is merely seeking to retain jurisdiction and maintain the status quo
pending a final decision on the merits. 2
b. Post-Trial Relief. - Where a violation is found which "may
have affected the outcome of an election, 3' 73 Section 402(c) expressly
provides that "the Court shall declare the election, if any, to be void
and direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of the Secretary. 3 74 "Since an election is not to be set aside for technical viola367. Id.

368. The liberal attitude of the Second Circuit in this regard is indicated by the
fact that it reversed a district court's discretionary denial of a temporary injunction
in the first case to come before it after its decision in Local 410. See id.

369. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). This provision was originally applicable
only after a trial on the merits. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; it was subsequently advanced to pre-trial availability.
370. Although the House version of the LMRDA, H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959), did expressly provide for judicial authority "to prevent and restrain
such violation and for such other relief as may be appropriate," section 402(a), also
had several other proposed bills, S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302(d), 405; H.R.
8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402(a) (1959). The fact that the Senate proposal was
adopted does not indicate any congressional attempt to restrict the federal court's
equitable jurisdiction. On the contrary, it represents a preoccupation with the choice
of public versus private enforcement suits and of "possible" over "actual" effect
prerequisites. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959). These were
major choices which, in the turmoil of the end of the congressional session, simply
left no time for the transposition of procedural niceties from one bill to the other.
See note 4 supra.
371. See Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 55 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,801, at
18,514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361
U.S. 98 (1946) ; Beaird, supra note 338, at 1337-39; cf. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 195, 203 (1839) ; Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836).
372. See Wirtz v. Local 1752, Longshoremen, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 18,998 (S.D.
Mass. 1963).
373. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (2) (1964). The same is true where "an election has not
been held within the time prescribed by Section 481. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1)
(1964).
374. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964). This section further provides that after the completion of the supervised election:
The Secretary shall promptly certify to the court the names of the persons elected,
persons
and by
theVillanova
court shall
thereupon
decreeof declaring
Published
University
Charlesenter
Widgera School
Law Digitalsuch
Repository,
1967to be the
officers of the labor organization. . . . An order directing an election, dismissing
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tions,"8 7 the court may not void an election unless these preconditions
are satisfied. Conversely, in view of the use of the mandatory "shall"
in defining the remedy, it would seem that once these conditions have
been met, then the court has no discretion and must void the election.87 Although the legislative history of section 4 02(c) is equivocal
on this point, 377 the language of the statute itself certainly is not.
This is not to say, however, that where there has been a violation
but no demonstration of "effect,

83

7

the federal courts have no residual

powers. 7 9

equitable
Where a candidate, despite a violation of his
rights under section 401, wins an election, it would seem that he should
at least be allowed to acquire an injunction prohibiting any interference
with his assumption of office. More specifically, for example, if incumbent candidates were to announce a false vote tally, the insurgents,
through the Secretary, should be able to seek immediate equitable
relief aimed at obtaining a proper declaration of results. 8 ' The alternatives of requiring a new election in such circumstances, or taking no
action whatsoever, would merely invite such unlawful action, particularly in close elections since the incumbents, in addition to remaining
in office during the entire pendency of the proceedings,88 ' would then
still have hopes of winning reelection. Thus although the violation
would be merely a technical one and could not have actually affected the
outcome of the election, it would create a situation for which sound
public policy would require immediate correction.
The congressional policy of avoiding useless elections,88 coupled
with its equally determined policy of rooting out union election abuses,
necessarily gives rise to a presumption that Congress intended the
federal courts to have flexible equitable powers of relief. Certainly
these policies do not give rise to a contrary presumption. "Unless a
a complaint, or designating elected officers of a labor organization shall be appealable in the same manner as the final judgment in a civil action, but an order
directing an election shall not be stayed pending appeal.
29 U.S.C. § 482(c)-(d) (1964) (emphasis added).
375. S. R9P. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).
376. But see Beaird, supra note 338, at 1336.
377. See note 370 supra; remarks of Senator Goldwater, in 105 CONG. Ric. 16489
(1959).
378. It is the policy of the Secretary of Labor not to sue unless he has "probable
cause to believe that the violations may have affected" the election outcome. 29 C.F.R.
§ 452.16(d) (1967). However, since the Secretary's findings are not determinative
of the issue, there obviously are cases where, although the violation is certain, the
courts will find no effect.
379. See note 370 supra.
380. Such a situation, in fact, developed in Jennings v. Carey, 51 CCH Lab. Cas.
19,423 (D.D.C. 1964). However, the issue was mooted when the incumbent voluntarily stepped down before a Title IV action could be filed.
381. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1964) provides that "[the challenged election shall be
presumed valid pending a final decision thereon . . . and in the interim the affairs
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
of the organization shall be conducted by the officers elected ... "
382. See S. REn. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).
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statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied." '
While the use of such
remedial powers will undoubtedly be few because of the Secretary's
restrictive suit position,3" 4 and because injunctions generally would be
inappropriate remedial devices," 3 such an approach is still necessary
to provide the sufficiency of flexibility which the courts will need to
render Title IV fully effective in the post-Calhoon LMRDA.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the ascertainment of the overall effects of Titles I and IV
must await further empirical study, 38 6 certain preliminary conclusions
seem warranted on the basis of the case analysis presented. Initially
it seems certain that Title I, despite being judicially limited in both its
jurisdictional and substantive scope, has nevertheless emerged as a
meaningful "Bill of Rights" for the union rank and file. This is especially true with regard to the guarantees of free speech and disciplinary due process, with the former in particular having received enlightened and significant interpretations from the courts. Although
it is doubtful that challenges to union establishments can be made with
complete impunity, it at least no longer seems necessary to require
either economic and social martyrdom or preliminary irresponsibility
in order to assert membership rights.
Negatively, however, it would seem that none of the other guarantees in Title I have proven particularly consequential. The equal protection clause is impotent against all but overt "discrimination," a
distinctly rara avis in this age of sublety. Furthermore, the protection
of the right to sue, with its concomitant exhaustion of remedies, differs little from the common law. While its absolute four month limitation has probably had beneficial results, as construed in Detroy, its
long term diminution of union self-initiative is disturbing. Finally, of
course, the problem of exorbitant dues was never regarded as serious
either prior to or after the passage of the Act.
Title IV, a considerably more economical remedy for the private
complainant than Title I, has nevertheless proven considerably less
popular among union members whenever they have been able to choose
383. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
384. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.16(a) (1967).
385. Since section 402 is an equitable remedy, Wirtz v. District Council 21,
Painters, 211 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1962), probably no action for damages could
be maintained, even if they could be shown.
386. The author initiated such research under the benefits of a W.W. Cook
Published
Villanova
CharlesofWidger
Schooland
of Law
Digital Repository,
1967the same.
ResearchbyGrant
at University
the University
Michigan,
is currently
completing
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between the two. Essentially limited to post-elective relief and subjected to high standards of proof and effect, Title IV has, as statutorily
and judicially developed, become an unwieldly instrument of reform in
many areas of its potential use. Rigidity of filing times, an absolute
exhaustion requirement, and a lengthly, highly detailed administrative
process of enforcement have rendered it quite accurate yet extremely
limited in its availability. It has, in effect, become a buffalo gun in an
area generally troubled with mice.
Perhaps the most substantial criticism of these titles, however,
lies not with the merits of either but rather with the disjointed coverage
which they provide for the broad spectrum of union elections. As interpreted by Calhoon, they have left a troublesome pre-election void for
which Title I provides no substantive rights and Title IV has little
jurisdictional basis. As a direct result of this remedy gap, there will
continue to be, even under the LMRDA, many instances in which
minor electoral violations will go uncorrected due to delay-caused
apathy or lack of a sufficient quantum of proof. While it is true that
the violations involved will seldom be of individual significance, their
potentially erosive effect upon the growth of union democracy certainly
will be.
Finally, apart from these substantive defects, Titles I and IV are
subject to further criticism because of the interpretive abdication to
the federal judiciary. From defining the very scope of membership
applicability to delineating the nature of their inter-relationship, as
well as the clarifying of a myriad of administrative problems, the courts
have, for all practical purposes, written these titles as they stand today.
While this in itself is not extraordinary, two factors combine to make
it objectionable in the context of the LMRDA. Initially, neither title is
a vague delegation of power, phrased in terms of reasonableness; interpretations here were required because of the consistent inability of
Congress to specify its intentions. Secondly, even apart from the justification of such an abdication as an abstract proposition, it should be
emphasized that in this instance it occurred in an area of traditional
judicial non-intervention.
The combined effect of this back-handed delegation and the traditional judicial conservatism in dealing with voluntary associations has
been an oftentimes fervent search for, and unjustified reliance upon,
ambiguous legislative history. By frequently failing to spell out its
own intentions in a clear manner, and at the same time failing to
provide a reasonable mandate for judicial action, Congress necessitated
the hesitant step-by-step approach which has thus far typified the adhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/1
ministration of Titles I and IV. This is not to deny that they have
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generally been construed in a manner consistent with the announced
congressional goals of union democracy. However, there is certainly
little reason to extol the virtues of a relatively haphazard and unpredictable statute merely because its original aims have been approximated.
Titles I and IV have provided a sound impetus towards union
democracy, partially because of their specific guarantees, but more so
because of the significance and stature which they have conveyed to the
concept of union democracy. While the practicality of this concept
has come under increasing attack as of late, particularly with regard
to its effect upon responsible collective bargaining, it still stands, as it
must, as the utopian goal of the American labor movement. 8 7 Temporary problems in its current implementation are not demonstrative of
theoretical defects, but, on the contrary, reinforce the necessity for such
democracy by demonstrating the deleterious effects created by its absence. Titles I and IV have many faults, but they are a long overdue
step in the right direction.
387. See note 6 supra.
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